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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main sources of confusion in debates over American nuclear 
strategy is a failure by commentators to recognise the clear distinction between what 
is commonly known as 'declaratory' and 'operational' policy.! The former refers to 
statements by the U.S. Administration on the requirements of deterrence and 
America's national security objectives more generally; while the latter refers to the 
actual war-fighting strategy the U.S. would attempt to implement in the event of 
nuclear war. American strategic nuclear doctrine is contained in a Single Integrated 
Operational Plan, or SIOP.2 A feature of American nuclear strategy over the past 
twenty years has been the incongruity between declaratory policy and actual war 
1/: planning. 
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The tendency for successive U.S. Administrations to alter declaratory policy 
by attaching a new label to what remains essentially an unaltered targeting doctrine, 
led to erroneous claims in 1974 (the Schlessinger Doctrine) and 1980 (PD-S9) that 
American nuclear strategy had fundamentally shifted from stable deterrence through 
'Assured Destruction', to a nuclear war-fighting strategy with an emphasis on 
counterforce targeting. In fact, since 1962, the United States has adhered to a nuclear 
war-fighting strategy of \vhich the principal objective has been damage limitation 
through the selective and controlled employment of nuclear weapons against military, 
political and industrial target sets in the Soviet Union. The exclusive targeting of 
Soviet cities has never been officially codified in American nuclear war plans. The 
dominant theme to emerge in the history of American nuclear strategy to 1989 is its 
1 
2 
The distinction was clearly made by Paul Nitze, 'Atoms, Strategy and Policy', 
Foreign Affairs, 34(2), January 1956, pp.187-198. 
For a history of the SlOP see Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 
1960-1983', in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear 
Targeting, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986, pp.S7-83; Peter Pringle and 
\Villiam Arkin, SlOP: Nuclear War from the Inside, Sphere Books, London, 
1983. 
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evolution towards a more refined and complex war-fighting strategy to strengthen the 
credibility of extended deterrent threats on behalf of distant allies) 
During the mid 1960s, however, Assured Destruction became declaratory 
policy for American strategic nuclear doctrine. While this policy did not resemble the 
targeting priorities contained in the SlOP, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
argued that an enduring capability to destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning 
twentieth century society in a retaliatory strike, was the basis for stable deterrence. 
Furthermore, as the Soviet Union gradually reduced America's overwhelming 
numerical superiority in long range nuclear weapons and acquired its own 
invulnerable force of retaliatory or second strike weapons, it was widely believed that 
a condition of Mutual Deterrence or Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) would 
II' become a permanent condition of the nuclear age.4 The sheer destructiveness of 
II 
III 
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery via intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), made it impossible to defend one's homeland from nuclear missile attack. 
MAD was raised to the status of orthodoxy in the United States arms control and 
strategic studies community during the 1960s. It was argued that the main criteria for 
strategic stability was the possession by both the Soviet Union and the United States, 
at all times, of an invulnerable retaliatory force of strategic nuclear weapons capable 
of inflicting unacceptable levels of damage upon each other's homeland. 
For more than two decades MAD has been exposed to a variety of criticisms 
relating to its weakness as a theory of nuclear deterrence and its suicidal character as 
an operational strategy. By the mid-1970s the critique of MAD found its most 
3 
4 
For the relationship between American nuclear strategy and extended 
deterrence see Earl C. Ravenal, 'Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate 
Connection', International Security, 6(4), Spring 1982, pp.20-43; Anthony 
Cordesman, Deterrence in the 1980s: Part 1, American Strategic Forces and 
Extended Deterrence, Adelphi Paper No.175, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, Summer, 1982; Walter Slocombe, 'Extended 
Deterrence', Washington Quarterly, 7(4), Fall 1984, pp.93-103. 
The most forthright statement of this view is Robert Jervis, 'MAD is the Best 
Possible Deterrent', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 41(3), March 1985, 
pp.43-45. 
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eloquent expression in the prolific writings of Colin Gray, a civilian strategic analyst 
at the forefront of 'New Wave' strategic theorists in the United States.5 According to 
Lawrence Freedman, Gray distinguished himself 'by his iconoclasm, refusal to bow to 
conventional wisdom, willingness to ask awkward questions and to offer 
uncompromising and sometimes outrageous answers'.6 Indeed, unlike many critics of 
MAD who only advocated greater flexibility and selectivity in targeting doctrine and 
the avoidance of city targeting for intra-war deterrence, Gray's critique was more 
profound and threatened to undermine the intellectual foundations of stable deterrence 
thinking. Gray's primary objective was to demonstrate why threats to destroy a fixed 
percentage of the Soviet population base - even as an ultimate dissuasive threat -
when the American homeland is totally vulnerable to nuclear retaliation, could not 
form the basis of either a credible pre-war deterrent or a sound operational strategic 
nuclear doctrine. The culmination of Gray's strategic theoretical writings was the 
articulation of a theory of victory in nuclear war in 1979. 
This thesis will assess the validity and relevance for the 1990s of Colin Gray's 
. . 
theory of victory. In the following chapter, the theory of victory will be described and 
explained. In particular the chapter will demonstrate how the theory of victory 
emerged from the strategic, political and technological environment of the 1970s and 
why Gray was compelled by strategic logic to go beyond the requirements of a war-
fighting strategy, such as limited nuclear war, to advocate a war-winning or classical 
strategy. Chapter Two will provide an overview of the criticisms of Gray's theory of 
victory that have gradually emerged in strategic studies literature. The chapter will 
demonstrate that \vhile such criticisms raise important questions pertaining to the 
5 
6 
After a brief period as Assistant Director of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies in London, Gray spent the second half of the 1970s as a 
professional staff member at the Hudson Institute. In 1981 he established and 
was founding President of the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, 
Virginia, a position he held until 1990. He is currently Chairman and 
President of National Security Research, Inc. 
Lawrence Freedman, 'The Strategists Vocation', Survival, xxv(4), July/August 
1983, p.170. This vie\v is shared by Ken Booth in his 'Book Review', Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 7(1), March 1984, pp.97-103. 
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operational uncertainties of Gray's theory of victory, its political and technological 
feasibility and its alleged negative impact on strategic stability, they remain deficient 
for not examining the underlying assumptions of the theory of victory. The final 
chapter will, therefore, identify and critically analyse the assumptions underpinning 
Gray's strategic advocacy. 
III 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF COLIN GRAY'S 
THEORY OF VICTORY IN NUCLEAR WAR 
Colin Gray's Critique of Stable Deterrence 
through Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 
It has become fashionable for contemporary strategists to argue that the 
creative period or 'Golden Age' of American strategic thinking is loosely bound by 
the publication of Military Policy and National Security (edited by W.W. Kaufman) 
in 1956 and On Escalation (by H. Kahn) in 1965;1 and that all subsequent 
commentaries add little to our understanding of strategic theory and borrow heavily 
II' from the intellectual capital of their predec~ssors.2 In 1971 Colin Gray began to 
I 
challenge the belief that an intellectual plateau had been reached concerning the 
impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy.3 While acknowledging that strategic 
studies literature of the 1950s and 1960s wa~ innovative and of a high calibre, Gray 
bel}eved that strategic theory was in constant need of revision. 4 
The main impetus for Gray's critique of stable deterrence through MAD was 
the interaction of emerging strategic, political and technological developments which 
1 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American 
Experience, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1982, especially 
chapter 4 'The Golden Age', pp.45-58. 
2 This theme is strongly conveyed in R. Jervis, 'Strategic Theory: What's New 
and What's True', in Roman Kolkowicz (ed.), The Logic of Nuclear Terror, 
Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp.47-81; L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear 
Strategy, Macmillan, London, 1981; and B. Brodie, 'The Development of 
Nuclear Strategy', International Security, 2(4), Spring 1978, pp.65-83. 
3 Colin S. Gray, 'The Rise and Fall of Academic Strategy', RUSI Journal, XVI, 
June 1971, pp.54-57. 
4 As early as 1971 Gray opined concerning strategic theory that one of the most 
dangerous beliefs is 'that a relatively timeless wisdom has been attained', in 
'Strategists: Some Views Critical of the Profession') I nternational Journal, 
XXVI, 1970-71, p.790. This has remained a firm belief in all of Gray's 
writings on strategic studies. See in particular his Strategic Studies: A 
Critical Assessment, Aldwych Press, London, 1982. A similar argument is 
advanced in H. Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969 ' in B. 
Porter (ed.), The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1960, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, pp.30-55. 
Ii: 
6 
he alleged undermined the validity of stable deterrence thinking. Consequently, Gray 
argued that the tenets of 'Golden Age' strategic studies literature required a major 
theoretical overhaul. Each of these three developments will now be examined as 
necessary background for a more complete understanding of Gray's critique of MAD 
and the development of his theory of victory in nuclear war. 
Gray argued that the emerging strategic environment of the 1970s would 
undermine America's ability to fulfil its foreign policy responsibilities especially in 
deterring and, if necessary, physically denying a Soviet takeover of Western Europe. 
The attainment by the Soviet Union of rough parity at the strategic nuclear level, 
together with conventional superiority in the European theatre, made U.S. extended 
deterrent threats (as embodied in NATO's strategy of Flexible Response) incredible 
because of the Soviet Union's capacity to retaliate against the American homeland.5 
Gray was adamant that the geopolitical basis for American national security required 
the U.S. to develop credible fIrst-use options for its long range nuclear weapons 
(ICBMs) to support distant allies facing conventional theatre defeat.6 American 
strategic nuclear forces should be able to support credibly U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. This would require a margin of American strategic superiority similar to 
that enjoyed in the late 1950s when the U.S. was theoretically capable of unleashing a 
decisive nuclear assault on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies without the 
risk of Soviet nuclear retaliation. As Gray stated in 1972: 
Great geopolitical insight is not required to perceive that a status quo, 
ocean-empire superpower [the United States] needs more raw strategic 
5 This thesis is discussed at length in Colin S. Gray, 'Mini-Nukes and Strategy ' , 
International Journal, XXIX, 1973-74, pp.222, 232-233. In 1979 Gray stated 
'NATO's central strategic concept, flexible response, is bankrupt', in 'NATO 
strategy and the Neutron Bomb', Policy Review, Winter 1979, p.12. See also 
his 'NATO's Nuclear Dilemma', Policy Review, ,22, Fall 1982, pp.97-11 6; 
and 'NATO Defense and Arms-Reduction Proposals', Military Review, 
LXIII(19), October 1983, pp.62-68. 
6 See The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the 
Technological Revolution, National Strategy Information Centre, New York, 
1977. 
II: 
power than does a dissatisfied heartland superpower [the Soviet 
Union].? 
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The emerging vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to total nuclear devastation would 
have a paralysing effect on America's freedom of action in the realm of foreign 
policy. 
One of the main assumptions of the strategic stability thesis was that through 
an extended process of anns control negotiations the United States would educate the 
Soviet Union on the requirements of stable deterrence. It was widely believed that 
Soviet strategic doctrine would gradually converge with the prevailing western 
concept of Assured Destruction.8 According to Gray, however, Soviet anns race 
behaviour during the 1960s, combined with an improved understanding of Soviet 
It doctrinal preferences, demonstrated that the Soviet Union was not content with 
attaining nuclear parity with the United States in accordance with a guiding principle 
of strategic stability. Gray became a leading exponent of the view that the Soviet 
Union 'thinks it could fight and win a nuclear war'.9 
Several arguments were advanced to support this view. Most importantly the 
Soviet Union rejected Western deterrence theory and endorsed the notion of 'victory' 
in nuclear war.lO This was allegedly demonstrated by the procurement of ICBMs 
capable of destroying America's land-based missile force, and massive investments in 
damage limitation capabilities, especially air and civil defence) 1 Gray also argued 
7 Colin S. Gray, 'The Arms Race is About Politics', Foreign Policy, 9, Winter 
1972-73, p.129. For Gray's first speculative piece on the desirability of 
strategic superiority for the U.S. see 'Strategic "Superiority" in Superpower 
Relations', Military Review, 21(12), December 1971, pp.8-21. 
8 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 
New York, 1973. 
9 Borrowed from R. Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union Thinks it can Fight and Win 
a Nuclear War', Commentary, 64(1), July 1977, pp.21-34. For a dissenting 
view see R. Arnett, 'Soviet Attitudes Toward Nuclear War: Do They Really 
Think They Can Win?', Journal of Strategic Studies, 2(2), Septen1ber 1979, 
pp.172-191. 
10 Colin S. Gray, 'The End of SALT? Purpose and Strategy in U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Negotiations', Policy Review, Fall 1977, pp.31-45. 
11 Colin S. Gray, 'From Disarmament to Arms Control, to ... What?', Futures, 
8(6), December 1976, especially pp.528-29. 
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that the Soviet Union's immediate objective was to erect a counter-deterrent to 
'neutralise any political leverage that an apparent strategic superiority might provide 
for the United States')2 The ultimate Soviet goal, however, was to attain strategic 
superiority over the United States.!3 Finally, it was argued that the Soviet Union used 
arms control negotiations as an arena for securing strategic and political advantage. 14 
Gray argued that a combination of offensive and defensive technologies 
emergIng In the mid to late 1970s would gradually undennine the assumption of 
stable deterrence that mutual vulnerability is a permanent condition of the nuclear 
age: 
... strategic options are now becoming available that were not possible 
when the still dominant notions of the transnational defense 
community of the West were formulated in the mid 1960s.15 
In particular, technologies for ballistic missiles such as Multiple Independently 
Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) and 
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) held the future possibility of offering a significant 
level of protection for the American homeland.16 This changing strategic, political 
and technological landscape provides the setting for Gray's scathing criticisms of 
'Golden Age' strategic thinking. Although Gray became increasingly sceptical of 
concepts such as limited war, crisis management and arms control his most vehement 
criticism was reserved for the concept at the pinnacle of stable deterrence thinking -
MAD. 
12 Colin S. Gray, 'Action and Reaction in the Nuclear Arms Race', Military 
Review, 21(8), August 1971, p.22. 
13 This is the central argument of Colin S. Gray, 'Soviet Rocket Forces: Military 
Capability, Political Utility', Air Force Magazine, 61(3), March 1978, pp.49-
55. 
14 Colin S. Gray, 'Security Through SALT?', Behind the Headlines, XXX(3-4), 
April 1971, pp.1-16; and 'SALT and the American Mood', Strategic Review, 
11(3),1975, p.46. 
15 Colin S. Gray, 'The "Second Wave": New Directions in Strategic Studies', 
RUSI Journal, 118(4), 1973, p.39. 
16 For a general discussion by Gray of the technologies emerging in the 1970s 
and how he perceived they would impact on strategy, see 'New Weapons and 
the Resort to Force', International Journal, XXX(2) , Spring 1975, pp.238-
258. 
..... 
The long overdue review of deterrence has been well begun ... by those 
who ... have at least been galvanised into mental activity by the rigidity 
and aridity of assured destruction. The intellectual plateau of the early 
1960s ... has at long last been cliscreclited. 17 
9 
Gray was hasty in his judgement that MAD had been discredited18 and, consequently, 
he mounted a persistent campaign against MAD throughout the 1970s. 19 
Gray's critique of MAD can be presented as four related charges. Firstly, 
threats of Assured Destruction lack credibility. A U.S. President would be self-
deterred from initiating nuclear operations if such a course of action resulted in 
hundreds of millions of American casualties. Furthermore, the Soviet Union with its 
war waging and war survival nuclear strategy would not be sufficiently deterred by 
U.S. threats to lay waste to a fixed percentage of its population base. Secondly, 
presuming that the U.S. proceeded to destroy Soviet society, what war time objectives 
would it hope to achieve if the Soviet Union could retaliate in kind? MAD made no 
political, military or strategic sense. Thirdly, threats of assured destruction are 
immoral; they affront the ethic?l dimensions of warfare and if implemented guarantee 
the wholesale destruction of Soviet society for the sins of its leaders. Fourthly, MAD 
cannot address the fundamental question - what nuclear strategy could the U.S. 
attempt to implement if nuclear deterrence failed or, in the words of Gray, if the 
Soviet Union was beyond American deterrent influence?20 
17 Colin S. Gray, 'What RAND Hath Wrought', Foreign Policy, 4, Fall 1971, 
p.125. 
18 Adherents to MAD were to make an admirable comeback during the mid 
1970s. See Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, 'The Mutual Hostage Relationship 
Between America and Russia', Foreign Affairs, 52(1), October 1973, pp.109-
118; and Jeron1e H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. 
Strategic Arms Policy, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1975. 
19 Gray also reserved his most colourful language for his critique of MAD. 
While supporters of MAD were referred to as a 'sickly breed', a deliberate 
policy of assured destruction would be a 'dereliction of strategic analytical 
duty' which if implemented would result in an 'orgy of civilian massacre'. 
20 The first detailed expression of these criticisms in Gray's writings is 'Unsafe 
at Any Speed: A Critique of "Stable Deterrence" Doctrine', RUSI Journal, 
118(2), June 1973, pp.23-217. Also useful is 'Of Bargaining Chips and 
Building Blocks: Arms Control and Defense Policy', International Journal, 
XXVIII, Spring 1973, pp.266-296. 
"'0lIl 
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These criticisms were developed over several years and were presented in 
varying degrees of intensity. Taken together they implied that, conceptually at least, 
there was a preferred nuclear strategy that would overcome or avoid the inherent 
operational deficiencies of MAD. A feature of Gray's critique of MAD was his 
difficulty in articulating a strategic nuclear doctrine that would 
a. resolve the dilemma of self-deterrence; 
b. achieve set political objectives in time of war; 
c. avoid the indiscriminate killing of Soviet citizens; 
d. provide the U.S. with a range of credible nuclear use options if 
deterrence failed; and 
e. provide a workable criterion for arms control. 
Gray confessed that his article 'Unsafe at Any Speed: A critique of Stable Deterrence' 
was more concerned with the 'identification of possible folly than ... with the task of 
providing constructive alternatives' .21 Gray echoed this view in a subsequent article 
by stating: 
It is one thing to argue that the dominant strain of reasoning on 
deterrence ... is morally reprehensible, politically paralysing and 
military non-sensical, it is quite another to produce a bright and 
shining alternative that does not contain features rendering it more 
undesirable than the ideas/posture that it is intended to replace.22 
Indeed Gray could offer no more than a terse summary of the themes to emerge from 
the works of those strategists critical of MAD,23 together with an outline of 'a new, 
21 Ibid., p.27. 
22 'The "Second Wave": New Directions in Strategic Studies', op.cit., p.39. 
23 For exan1ple, see Arthur Lee Bums, Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear 
Balance Without Hostage Cities, Adelphi Paper No.69, Institute For Strategic 
Studies, London, July 1970; Michael May, 'Some Advantages of a 
Counterforce Deterrence', Orbis, XIV(2) Summer 1972, pp.271-283; and 
B.M. Russett, 'A Countercombatant Deterrent? Feasibility, Morality and Arms 
Control', in S.C. Sarkesian (ed.), The Military-Industrial Complex: A 
Reassessment, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1972, pp.201-242. 
..... 
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more balanced strategic posture' characterised by a mixture of 'hostage cities', 
'defensive' and 'counterforce' doctrines.24 
Although the focus of Gray's critique of MAD was on its alleged deficiency as 
a theory of nuclear deterrence, by 1976, Gray had conceived a rudimentary alternative 
theory of nuclear deterrence. The extent of his revision to stable deterrence thinking 
did not proceed beyond two tentative themes. While Soviet leaders might be 
sufficiently deterred in times of peace by American threats to destroy the Soviet 
Union, a strategy of Assured Destruction would amount to U.S. defeat in war because 
the Soviet Union was investing in a substantial capability for damage limitation and 
was planning for a decisive military and political victory if deterrence failed. The 
second theme was that a strategy of deterrence must address Soviet, and not 
American, fears although Gray did not examine the exact nature of official Soviet 
fears and anxieties and how they would be exploited by the U.S. in an operational 
strategic nuclear doctrine. 
From Nuclear War-Fighting to the Theory of Victory: A Preliminary Analysis 
After 1976 the disparate elements of what could loosely be described as a 
nuclear war-fighting strategy began to gel into a coherent and articulate strategic 
doctrine to fonn the basis of Gray's theory of victory. The transition from Gray's 
critique of MAD to the formulation of a theory of victory in nuclear war can be 
roughly divided into two phases. Between 1977-78 Gray argued vociferously that for 
geopolitical reasons the United States required the freedom to initiate limited 
offensive strategic nuclear operations to support allies facing Soviet military 
aggression in Europe and its periphery.25 According to Gray, however, the credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrent threats was being eroded by the emerging condition of 
mutual vulnerability. American leaders would be self-deterred from using nuclear 
24 Colin S. Gray, 'Rethinking Nuclear Strategy', Orbis, XVII(4), Winter 1974, 
pp.1175-1160. 
25 Colin S. Gray, 'The Strategic Forces Triad: End of The Road?', Foreign 
Affairs, 56(4), Fall 1978, pp.775-776. 
~ 
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weapons to prevent Soviet expansionism in Europe. More importantly, Gray 
contended that even if the United States had the desired flexibility in its nuclear 
targeting doctrine and proceeded to execute its selective nuclear options in time of 
war, the result would be a process of rapid vertical escalation leading to a Soviet 
military and political victory.26 The Soviet Union would be free to destroy up to 90 
per cent of America's vulnerable land based ICBMs (Titan and Minuteman) in a swift 
retaliatory strike. 
In principle there were two solutions to America's nuclear dilemma as 
perceived by Gray. The U.S. could either protect its population through a 
combination of active and passive defenses - physically denying the Soviet Union 
direct access to the American homeland - or rely on a superior nuclear targeting 
doctrine and force structure to achieve a favourable war outcome. The first solution 
was not feasible in the mid-1970s because the required technologies did not exist and 
the political climate in the U.S. was not conducive to a strategic debate on ballistic 
missile defence (BMD). Gray neith~r apvanced a strategic case for BMD nor 
explored in detail the relationship between deterrence and defence. He was 
preoccupied with devising a nuclear strategy for the United States that would 
strengthen deterrence in the 1980s and be successfully implemented if deterrence 
failed without any defensive coverage for the American homeland. 
The key to Gray's nuclear war-fighting strategy was the deployment of a 
survivable land-based counterforce ICBM capable of destroying the most highly 
valued military and political assets of the Soviet state. This was the basis of Gray 's 
support for the MX (Missile Experimental) ICBM throughout the 1970s and 1980s.27 
26 Ibid., especially pp.77S-776. 
27 See Gray's 'Soviet-American Strategic Competition: Instruments, Doctrines, 
and Purposes' in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie (eds), Nuclear 
Strategy and National Security: Points of View, American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 1977, pp.278-301; 'The MX 
Debate', Survival, XX(3), May/June 1978, pp.105-112; 'Does Theory Lead 
Technology?', International Journal, XXXIII(3), Summer 1978, p.S22; 'The 
MX ICBM and Nuclear Strategy', International Defense Review, 14(7), 1981, 
pp.8SS-862. The extent of Gray's support for MX can be guaged by his 
~ 
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But Gray did not advocate MX as a fIrst strike or pre-emptive weapon to disarm the 
Soviet Union. He argued that MX should be deployed as a secure second strike 
counterforce weapon designed to deter Soviet vertical escalation following an 
American campaign of limited and selective nuclear strikes. According to Gray, the 
Soviet Union would not deliberately embark on a process of nuclear escalation 
knowing that it could not destroy a survivably deployed MX and that such an ICBM 
could in turn promptly retaliate against the essential assets of the Soviet state, thus 
thwarting its war time objectives., Such a targeting doctrine would allegedly 
strengthen deterrence by enhancing Soviet pre-war anxieties.28 
Gray had barely elaborated this nuclear war-fIghting strategy of Soviet 
'victory denial' when dissatisfaction with its key operational features began to surface 
in his writings. Gray became convinced that an American strategy of Soviet victory 
denial in an era of mutual vulnerability would not sufficiently overcome the problem 
of self-deterrence inherent in nuclear threats that risk intolerable levels of destruction 
to one's homeland. Furthermore, victory denial was judged to be an inferior strategic 
objective. At best, it would not enable the United States to force a favourable war 
outcome while at worst it would threaten a U.S. defeat because of the Soviet Union's 
capability to escalate to higher levels of violence. 
These deficiencies prompted Gray to refine his strategic thinking. By 1979 he 
reached two important conclusions that determined the course of his strategic 
advocacy during the 1980s. Firstly, the only circumstances where an American 
President could credibly and sensibly sanction the employment of offensive strategic 
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union would be those in which the U.S. could 
succinct letters sent to the editors of several prominent American newspapers -
'Defense: What the MX is All About', New York Times, 19 October 1977, 
p.24; 'What the MX Would do to Soviet Defense Planners', New York Times) 
16 April 1980, p.A26: 'Why the U.S. Needs the MX in its Future', Christian 
Science Monitor, 8 September 1982, p.23; 'We Need the MX, for Deterrence 
and Stability', New York Times) 12 November 1982, p.A26. 
28 Colin S. Gray, 'SALT: Why we Must "Enhance Soviet Anxiety''', Ne w York 
Times, 16 January 1977, p0l8. 
., 
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offer a substantial measure of physical protection for the American homeland from 
nuclear retaliation.29 Secondly, the United States' primary strategic objective in a 
nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union should be the forcible dissolution of the 
Soviet state. Targeting the Soviet state should have the maximum deterrent influence 
on the minds of its political and military leaders. How would the U.S. devise its 
nuclear war plan, the SlOP, to fulfil this demanding strategic objective? According to 
Gray: 
To defeat the Soviet state, the United States must plan to degrade and 
destroy its assets. Preeminent among these assets are: the respect of 
the Soviet peoples, the military forces of the state; the police and 
paramilitary forces of the state, the civilian command apparatus (party 
and governmental - at alllevels).30 
Physically protecting the American homeland with strategic, air and civil 
defences, and targeting the Soviet state apparatus with long range nuclear weapons 
are the key components of Gray's theory of victory in nuclear war. Gray articulated 
his war-winning strategy in 'Nuclear Strategy: The Case For a Theory of Victory'31 
and reiterated his thesis in an article titled 'Victory is Possible', co-authored with 
Keith Payne.32 
The United States should plan to defeat the Soviet Union and to do so 
at a cost that would not prohibit U.S. recovery. Washington should 
identify war aims that in the last resort would contemplate the 
29 See the concluding paragraphs to Colin S. Gray, 'The MX ICBM: Why We 
Need It', Air Force Magazine, 62(8), August 1979, pp.66-71. 
30 Colin S. Gray, 'Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities', Air Force Magazine, 62(3 ), 
March 1979, pp.60-64. In the late 1970s, Gray exerted most of his energies on 
strategic nuclear targeting issues and was indirectly involved in the targeting 
reviews undertaken by the Cater Administration. For example, Daniel Ford 
noted that Gray was a participant in a series of 'Internal Conferences on War 
Aims and Strategic Forces' conducted in 1979-80 under the auspices of TRW 
'a major defense contractor with strong connections to the Reagan 
Administration', cited in The Button: The Nuclear Trigger - Does it Work? 
Counterpoint, London, 1986, p.128. 
31 International Security, 4(1), Summer 1979, pp.54-87. 
32 Foreign Policy, 39, Summer 1980, pp.140-27. For a brief summary of the 
theory of victory see, in addition to the two articles cited above, Gray ' s 'The 
Military Requirements of US Strategy', Military Review, LIX(9), September 
1979, pp.2-13 and 'Strategic Forces and SALT: A Question of Strategy', 
Cornparative Strategy, 2, Summer 1980, pp.123-124. 
destruction of Soviet political authority and the emergence of a 
postwar world order compatible with Western values)3 
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Although Gray claimed to be offering a clear and obtainable nuclear war-time 
objective for the United States - political victory - Stephen Kull is correct in noting 
that Gray and Payne provide no detail of how the United States would emerge 
victorious from global nuclear war.34 Three years later, through a series of 
penetrating interviews with high level American strategic thinkers throughout the 
Department of Defence and State, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Security 
Council, Congress and Washington's influential defence think tanks, Steven Kull 
demonstrated that while advocates of victory in nuclear war develop articulate 
arguments in writing they are reduced to incoherence and confusion when pressed to 
enunciate the exact meaning of 'victory' in nuclear war.35 
, 
, 
. 
Gray presented his theory of victory as the only operational nuclear strategy 
where the United States could achieve set political objectives based on a superior 
theory of nuclear deterrence. He did this by framing his discussion with two 
questions. What would Soviet leaders find most deterring in nuclear war: the 
certainty of widespread urban/industrial destruction or the prospect of losing central 
political authority at home? And, what strategy would it be in the United States' 
interest to implement if deterrence failed resulting in a military confrontation between 
the superpowers? Gray argued that through targeting the Soviet State apparatus with 
long range offensive nuclear weapons and offering a significant level of physical 
protection for the American population, pre-war deterrence would be strengthened 
and the threat of nuclear war would recede. Gray defended the theory of victory with 
two additional arguments. If deterrence failed completely (i.e. the Soviet Union is 
33 'Victory is Possible', op.cit., p.2l. 
34 Steven Kull, 'Nuclear Nonsense', Foreign Policy, 58, Spring 1985, p.39. 
35 Steven Kull, Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflict of Defense 
Policymakers, Basic Books, New York, 1988. It is worth mentioning that 
Kull conducted interviews at the National Institute for Public Policy when 
Colin Gray was President. 
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beyond American deterrent influence or the 'fog of war' results in rapid escalation) 
the U.S. would have no choice but to wage nuclear war as effectively as possible. A 
war-winning strategy, therefore, provides insurance against the possibility of 
deterrence failure. The theory of victory was also judged to be a morally acceptable 
strategy which satisfactorily addressed the Just War principles of the Catholic Church, 
especially those of discrimination, proportionality and non-combatant immunity.36 
After 1980, the most persistent claim in Gray's writings is that he was 
compelled by 'strategic logic' to go beyond the requirements of a war-fighting 
strategy, such as limited nuclear war for intra-war deterrence, to advocate a war 
winning or classical strategy}7 Gray is wholly supportive of flexibility and selectivity 
in strategic nuclear targeting doctrine.38 He argues strongly, however, that a 
capability to execute limited nuclear options (LNOs) is by itself deficient when 
. 
I 
divorced from an overall plan of how the U.S. could achieve 'escalation dominance' 
and force war termination upon the Soviet Union on terms favourable to the United 
States.39 Gray is very critical of strategies for li!TIited nuclear war when, ~ither, they 
are informed by a theory of deterrence which sanctions as its ultimate dissuasive 
36 'Victory is Possible', op.cit., pp.16-17. It is worth noting that in all of Gray's 
subsequent writings on nuclear strategy the theory of victory is defended with 
strategic, rather than moral, arguments. Keith Payne, however, has pursued 
the moral case for a nuclear war winning strategy. See 'The Bishops and 
Nuclear Weapons', Orbis, 37(3), Fall 1983, pp.535-543; 'What I Did and Did 
Not Say, and Why: Reply to Russett', Orbis, 38(2), Summer 1984, ppA04-
498; Keith B. Payne and Karl 1. Payne, A Just Defense: The Use of Force, 
Nuclear Weapons and Our Conscience, Multnomah Press, Portland, 1987. 
37 See in particular 'Issues and Non-Issues in the Nuclear Policy Debate', 
Bulletin o/the Atomic Scientists, 37(10), December 1981, p.48. 
38 In 1982 Gray stated bluntly 'I am frequently puzzled about what the preferred 
nuclear strategy of a strong critic of limited nuclear war planning would be ... 
In truth, we are all advocates of limited nuclear war planning (for deterrence) 
because there is no choice. The supposed debate over limited nuclear war is 
really no debate at all'. Cited in 'Dangerous To Your Health: The Debate 
Over Nuclear Strategy and War', Orbis, 26(2), Spring 1982, pp.344-345. 
39 For a detailed explanation of how American strategic superiority could be 
used to achieve 'escalation dominance' see Colin S. Gray 'The Idea of 
Strategic Superiority', Air Force Magazine, 65(3) March 1982, pp.62-63; 
'SALT II: The Real Debate', Pol(cy Review, 10, Fall 1979, pp.11-12; and 'The 
Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Balance ', in Richard F. Staar (ed.), Arms 
Control: Myth Versus Reality, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1984, pp.28, 
36 
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threat the destruction of Soviet society or, they rely on Soviet cooperation and 
bargaining for the restoration of deterrence into war itself. It is most unlikely that the 
Soviet Union would conform to American rules for the conduct of limited and 
controlled nuclear war, because Soviet strategic nuclear planning is guided by the 
clear objective of achieving a swift military and political victory.40 According to 
Gray, American nuclear strategy will only be operationally sound if strategic planning 
is conducted from the top down. In other words, without a plausible theory of victory 
or war termination, planning for limited nuclear war makes little sense and is likely to 
fail in time of war. 
A basic truth concerning strategic targeting design is that the 
credibility, effectiveness, and real-time attractiveness of lower level ... 
strike options has to be a function of the credibility and assessed 
probable effectiveness of the entire strategic targeting design.41 
There were no noteworthy additions to Gray's strategic theory in the early to 
mid 1980s. Practically all his writings subsequent to the two theory of victory articles 
in 1979 and 1980 promote and defend his strategic advocacy, especially the 
. 
40 This view is conveyed in Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in 
American and Soviet Strategic Policy, RAND, Santa Monica, R-2034-DDRE, 
December 1976; and Desmond Ball, 'Soviet Strategic Planning and the 
Control of Nuclear War', in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz 
(eds), The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, Lexington Books, Lexington, 
1986, pp.49-67. Several analysts believe that the Soviet Union would be 
interested in waging nuclear war with control and discrimination. See Albert 
Wohlstetter, 'Between An Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices', 
Foreign Affairs, 63(5), Summer 1985, pp.962-964; and Notra Trulock III, 
'Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare' in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert 
Wohlstetter and David S. Yost (eds), Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, 
and New Choices For Long-Range Offense and Defense, Lexington Books, 
Lexington, 1987, pp.53-85. However, the weight of evidence strongly 
suggests otherwise. 
41 Colin Gray, 'Targeting Problems For Central War', Naval War College 
Review, 33(1), January-February 1980, pp.3-21. This thesis is restated in 
'Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Crisis Management', Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 457, September 1981, 
p.74; 'Forward' in Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S. - Soviet 
Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, XIV; and in the 
correspondence between Michael Howard and Colin Gray in 'Perspectives on 
Fighting a Nuclear "Var', International Security, 6(1), Summer 1981, p.186. 
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importance of population defenses for the efficacy of deterrence42 and the necessity of 
a nuclear war-winning strategy.43 Up to 1986, the most significant development was 
Gray providing a label for his theory of victory - Damage Limitation For Deterrence 
and Coercion - as a means of contrasting his strategic preferences with rival 
positions.44 
The Theory of Victory and American Nuclear Strategy 1962-1989 
Gray's theory of victory initially appeared more novel than a close reading 
would have otherwise suggested and to be on the fringe of mainstream thinking in the 
Carter Administration and the extra-official strategic studies community. Set against 
a background of American strategic nuclear doctrine from the early 1960s and the 
works of several influential strategists, however, it becomes clear that Gray's strategic 
advocacy' was far less extreme than the title 'victory is possible' might have led one to 
believe. This proposition needs to be further examined. 
Gray's central argument - that U.S. nuclear strategy should move towards a 
theory of victory - appeared an extreme thesis simply because much of his 
argumentation was built upon a critique of MAD, the antithesis of the theory of 
victory.45 The intellectual antecedents of Gray's strategic thinking were clearly 
42 Particularly revealing are Gray's written statements to the U.S. Congress. See 
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
Hearings, Strategic Defense and National Security, 98th Congress, 1st 
Session, 10 November 1983, pp.l00-146; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Armed Services, Hearings, Strategic Defense Initiative, 98th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 24 April 1984, pp.3075-3128; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Appropriations, Hearings, SDI Policy Issues, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 
22 April 1985, pp.401-427. See in addition Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, 
'Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition', Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984, 
pp.820-842; and Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Defense, Deterrence and the 
Prospects for Peace', Ethics, 95(3) April 1985, pp.659-672. 
43 Colin S. Gray, 'Defense, War-Fighting and Deterrence', Naval War College 
Review, XXXV(4) July-August 1982, pp.38-43; 'War-Fighting For 
Deterrence', Journal of Strategic Studies, 7(1), March 1984, pp.5-28. 
44 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, Philadelphia, 1984, pp.79-86. 
45 A point highlighted by Philip K. Lawrence, Preparing For Armageddon: A 
Critique of Western Strategy, WheatsheafBooks, Sussex, 1988, p.141. 
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articulated by Herman Kahn and Donald Brennan in their respective writings on 
nuclear strategy during the 1960s. Kahn had been a long time exponent of the view 
that the United States 'think about the unthinkable', meaning it should plan to fight, 
survive and win a nuclear war if deterrence failed.46 Brennan influenced the direction 
of Gray's thinking because he was one of the first strategists to examine in detail the 
relationship between population defenses and de terrence. 47 Advocates of victory in 
nuclear war can even be traced to the dawn of the nuclear age.48 
More importantly, Gray's almost exclusive focus on attempting to undermine 
the foundations of stable deterrence thinking drew attention away from the vital fact 
that American strategic nuclear doctrine had never resembled Assured Destruction. 
At no stage in the development of American nuclear war plans was targeting doctrine 
preoccupied solely with the decimation of Soviet urban/industrial centres.49 Since the 
, 
early 1960s and up to the time Gray developed his theory of victory, the U.S. adhered 
to a nuclear war-fighting strategy which emphasised flexibility and control to prevent 
all out nuclear war and keep damage to the American homeland at a minimum Jeve1.50 
46 H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1960; Thinking About the Unthinkable, Horizon Press, New York, 1962. 
47 Donald G. Brennan, 'The Case For Missile Defense', Foreign Affairs, 43(3), 
April 1969, pp.633-648. 
48 William Liscum Borden, There Will Be No time: The Revolution in Strategy, 
Macmillan, New York, 1946. 
49 See the two thoroughly researched articles by David Alan Rosenberg, '''A 
Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours": Documents on American 
Plans for Nuclear War With the Soviet Union, 1954-1955', International 
Security, 6(3) Winter 1981/82, pp.3-38; and 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear 
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-60', International Security, 
7(4),Spring 1983, pp.3-71. 
50 A.L. Friedberg, 'A History of the U.S. Strategic "Doctrine" - 1945-1980', 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 3(3), December 1980, pp.37-71; Desmond Ball, 
'U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?', International Security, 
7(3), Winter 1982/83, pp.31-60; Targeting For Strategic Deterrence, Adelphi 
Paper No.185, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1983; 
Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, 'U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution', 
Strategic Review, 12(1), Winter 1984, pp.19-28. For an excellent account of 
the role of civilian strategists in the formulation of strategic nuclear concepts 
and doctrines see F. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1983. 
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Soon after the Kennedy Administration entered office in January 1961 , 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara presided over a fundamental reVISIon of 
SIOP-62, a war plan for the simultaneous launching of 3,500 nuclear weapons at an 
'optimum mix' of military and civilian targets in the Soviet Union.51 McNamara 
wanted flexibility in the SlOP to provide the United States with a wider range of 
attack options, ranging from Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, bomber bases and 
submarine tenders to an all out urban/industrial nuclear assault (which was the least 
preferred option).52 In an address to European allies on 16 June 1962, McNamara 
provided the clearest statement of what became known as the 'No-Cities' strategy. 
The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent 
feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war 
should be approached in much the same way that more conventional 
military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, 
principle military objectives in the event of a nuclear war ... should be 
the destruction of the enemy's military forces, and not his civilian 
population.53 
He concluded by saying that the use of force against the cities of a major power 
would be 'tantamount to suicide' .54 The 'No-Cities' strategy was codified in SIOP-63 
which took effect on 1 August 1962.55 The U.S. objective in nuclear war would be to 
initially target the Soviet Union's military establishment with deliberation and control 
and purposely refrain from striking Soviet cities. The rationale was to hold Soviet 
cities hostage to restore intra-war deterrence by threatening their destruction with the 
large percentage of strategic forces held in reserve.56 
51 D. Rosenberg, 'Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making 
of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-68', Journal of Strategic Studies, 
9(1), March 1986, p.43. 
52 Desmond Ball, Targeting For Strategic Deterrence, op.cit., pp.10-14. 
53 'Nuclear Weapons in Western Defence: Address by Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara, Ann Arbor, June 16 1962' in R. Stebbins (ed.), 
Documents on American Foreign Relations 1962, Harper and Row, New 
York, 1963, p.233. 
54 Loc. cit. 
55 For a detailed discussion of SIOP-63 see Desmond Ball, 'The Development of 
the SlOP, 1960-1983', op.cit., pp.62-70. 
56 This rationale is explained in A. Enthoven, 'American Deterrent Policy', 
Address to the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, 10 
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In his public and offical addresses, McNamara soon began to deemphasise the 
'no-cities' strategy. Between 1964-66, declaratory policy was a mixture of Assured 
Destruction and Damage Limitation but by 1967, McNamara's rhetoric focused 
exclusively on Assured Destruction.57 There were several reasons why McNamara 
publicly abandoned his 'no-cities' strategy. Apart from widespread criticism in the 
United States and by several European allies,58 McNamara realised that the prospects 
of limiting damage to the American homeland through counterforce reprisals would 
become less feasible as the Soviet Union acquired more invulnerable strategic nuclear 
forces. With the prospect of nuclear parity a strategy of damage limitation through 
counterforce targeting became less viable.59 In addition, McNamara' s strategy relied 
on weapon systems and Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) 
facilities that had not been developed. The theoretical discussions of controlled and 
limited nuclear war were overshadowed by technological constraints. Finally, and 
most importantly, the goal of destroying Soviet strategic forces so as to make an 
appreciable difference to the number of Americans surviving a Soviet retaliatory 
strike, generated an open ended requirement for more Minuteman ICBMs and the 
procurement of a force of supersonic reconnaissance strike bombers.60 
It is important to stress that McNamara's emphasis on Assured Destruction 
after 1967 in no way resembled actual strategic nuclear doctrine. Assured Destruction 
was distinctly declaratory policy.61 U.S. targeting doctrine - as codified in SlOP-63 
with its emphasis on flexibility and restraint - remained unchanged until the mid 
1970s, when a detailed review of strategic doctrine under the Nixon Administration 
February 1963, Survival, 5(3), May/June 1963, pp.94-101; W. Kaufman, The 
McNamara Strategy, Harper and Row, New York, 1964. 
57 Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983 ' , op.cit., pp.68-69. 
58 A vocal critic of the 'No-Cities' strategy was Michael Brower. See his two 
articles 'Controlled Thennonuclear War', The New Republic, 30 July 1962, 
pp.9-15, and 'Nuclear Strategy of the Kennedy Administration ', Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 18(10), October 1962, pp.34-41. 
59 D. Rosenberg, 'Reality and Responsibility', op.cit., p.46. 
60 Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983', op.cit, p.68. 
61 A. Enthoven, '1963 Nuclear Strategy Revisited' in H.P. Ford and F. Williams 
(eds), Ethics and Nuclear Strategy?, Orbis, New York, 1977, pp.72-81. 
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resulted in the formulation of a revised nuclear war plan, SIOP-5, which took effect 
on 1 January 1976.62 A feature of SIOP-5 was its emphasis on targeting those Soviet 
political, economic and military assets that would facilitate post war recovery. In 
addition, the concept 'Escalation Control' became an overriding policy objective. 
According to Desmond Ball, this would enable the National Command Authority 
(NCA) 'to execute their options in a deliberate and controlled fashion throughout the 
progress of a strategic nuclear exchange' .63 The targeting review undertaken between 
1969 and 1974 resulted in Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger promulgating a 
new declaratory policy characterised by 'selective options' and 'flexibility in 
targeting'.64 Schlesinger effectively buried Assured Destruction as declaratory policy. 
Providing an overview of American nuclear strategy in the 1960s and mid 
1970s demonstrates that when Gray fIrst advocated his theory of victory,in 1979, both 
u.S. strategic nuclear doctrine and declaratory policy had moved far beyond the 
concept of Assured Destruction. Similarities between American nuclear strategy and 
the theory of victory could, therefore, be identified. They both embraced the need for 
controlled and selective nuclear options and deemphasised the targeting of Soviet 
cities. However, the most important operational requirements of the theory of victory 
- targeting the Soviet S tate apparatus and affording protection for the American 
population against nuclear missile attack through active and passive defenses - had 
not yet received official endorsement as priority strategic objectives (even though 
Soviet leadership centres were codified in SIOP-5 for the purpose of intra-war 
deterrence and intra-war bargaining).65 At the beginning of 1981, Colin Gray's 
62 For details see Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983', 
op.cit., pp.70-75. 
63 Ibid., p.73. 
64 'Excerpts from the Press Conference of U.S. Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger, 10 January 1974', Survival, 16(2), March/April 1974, pp.86-90. 
For a detailed critique see Desmond J. Ball, 'Deja Vu: The Return to 
Counterforce in the Nixon Administration: (Or, the Politics of Potential 
Nuclear Castration) in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Strategic Nuclear Balance: 
An Australian Perspective, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 
1974, pp.149-232. 
65 Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983', op. cit., p.73. 
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theory of victory remained a well articulated strategic nuclear doctrine offered as a 
superior theory of nuclear deterrence but it was publicly supported by only a restricted 
number of individuals.66 
In 1981 the Reagan Administration entered office voicing a strong anti-Soviet 
rhetoric and a pledge to restore America's alleged declining military power base. 
Indeed, a record level of peacetime defence spending together with a sharp downturn 
in Soviet-American political relations were features of the first Reagan 
Administration's defence and foreign policies. Many of those individuals who gained 
notoriety during the 1970s for espousing al~st views on Soviet military power and 
the nuclear imbalance tilting in favour of the Soviet Union, were recruited into key 
national security and arms control advisory positions in the Reagan Administration.67 
Gray was offered the position of consultant to the State Department on Arms 
Control and became a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency68 (a position he held until 1988). It is generally 
acknowledged that Gray influenced official thinking on nation,!l security issues and 
that his thesis on war-fighting deterrence was in general accord with the strategic 
priorities of the Reagan Administration. As Gray acknowledged in 1981, 
It does so happen that the argument in my recent articles in International 
Security ['The Case for a Theory of Victory'] and Foreign Policy 
['Victory is Possible'] are about as close to current U.S. official 
thinking as one is likely to find anywhere in the public domain. 69 
66 Support for Gray's theory of victory in the literature can be located in Keith B. 
Payne, 'Deterrence, Arms Control and U.S. Strategic Doctrine', Orbis, 25(3), 
Fall 1981, pp.747-770; Nuclear Deterrence in U.S. - Soviet Relations, op.cit.; 
Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Renewal of Strategy', in Samuel P. Huntington 
(ed.), The Strategic Imperative: New Policies For American Security, 
Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, especially p.12. 
67 This is especially true for members of the Committee on the Present Danger. 
For the Committee's publications since its inception on 11 November 1976 to 
1984 see Charles Tyroler III (ed.), Alerting America: The Papers of the 
Committee on the Present Danger, Pergamon Brasseys, Washington, 1984. 
68 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear "YVar, 
Vintage Books, New York, 1983, pp.34-35. 
69 Colin Gray, 'Chacun a son gout', Bulletin of the Aton2ic Scientists, 37(6), 
June/July 1981, p.6J. 
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Throughout the 1980s it was not surprising that Gray supponed the Administration' s 
arms build-up and staunchly defended its record on arms contro1.70 Even Gray's 
contribution to debates on issues as diverse as the nuclear freeze movement, the 
nuclear winter thesis and alleged Soviet violations of arms control agreements echoed 
the rhetoric emanating from the American defence establishment.?1 It would be 
misleading to overstate the impact of one government advisor on a process such as the 
formulation and codification of strategic nuclear doctrine which is influenced more by 
the complex interplay of bureaucratic, political and technological factors than by the 
wishes of civilian strategists.72 While specific examples do highlight Gray's direct 
input into official guidance for strategic doctrine,73 there are many instances where 
Gray's advocacy had no impact on the decision making process.74 It remains 
70 Colin S. Gray and Jeffrey G. Barlow, 'Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of 
American Military Power in the 1970s', International Security, 10(2), Fall 
1985, pp.27-69; Colin S. Gray, 'We Told Him to Build and He Did', Los 
Angeles Times, 4 November 1987, p.9; 'President Reagan Should Stick to His 
Guns on Arms Control', Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1983, Part V, p.3; 'The 
Reagan Administration and Arms Control', in Desmond Ball and Andrew 
Mack (eds), The Future of Arms Control, Australian National University 
Press, Sydney, 1987, pp.45-66. 
71 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Freeze?', Parameters, XIII(2), June 1983, p.74-80; 
Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne (eds), The Nuclear Freeze Controversy, Abt 
Books, Lanham, 1984; Colin S. Gray, 'The Nuclear Winter Thesis and U.S. 
Strategic Policy', Washington Quarterly, 8(3), Summer 1985, pp.85-96. For 
Gray's views on Soviet Treaty violations see 'Moscow is Cheating', Foreign 
Policy, 56, Fall 1984, pp.141-152; 'Verification of Non-Compliance: The 
Problem of Response', Defense Science 2003+, 4(5), OctoberlNovember 
1985, pp.29-39; 'Nuclear Delusions: Six Arms Control Fallacies', Policy 
Review, 37, Summer 1986, especially pp.50-51. See also Gray's latest 
contribution to the issue of arms control verification, 'Does Verification 
Really Matter? Facing Political Facts About Arms Control Non Compliance', 
Strategic Review, XVIII(2), Spring 1990, pp.32-42. 
72 Desmond Ball, The Evolution of United States Strategic Policy Since 1945: 
Doctrine, Military Technical Innovation and Force Structure, Reference Paper 
No.164, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, January 1989; 
and David Alan Rosenberg, 'U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs Practice', 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 44(3), March 1987, pp.20-26. 
73 Gray is alleged to have contributed to the drafting of the 1982 five year 
Defence Guidance Plan. See L. Wieseltier, Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1983, p.51. 
74 Drawing on a specific example, despite Gray's strong endorsement of strong 
defence it has been clearly demonstrated that think tanks such as the National 
Institute for Public Policy had no influence on President Reagan's decision to 
proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. See David Carlton, 
'Rendering Nuclear Weapons Impotent and Obsolete: The Origins of a 
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impossible to precisely calculate the influence of Gray's strategic thinking on the 
direction of American nuclear strategy during President Reagan's two terms in office. 
There is considerable merit in the following judgement by Stephen Cimbala: 
... a close reading of Gray's contributions to the strategic debate 
suggests that he is not so deviant from the mainstream of U.S. strategic 
thinking as critics have supposed. Gray has in fact been influential 
precisely because the mainstream has moved in directions congenial to 
his suggestions, although undoubtedly not as far as he might wish.75 
The strategic arguments used to develop the theory of victory thesis received 
increasing official recognition from within the Reagan Administration, and during the 
1980s, three important developments resulted in Gray's strategic preferences gaining 
representation in America's nuclear war plan, the SlOP. Firstly, the Reagan 
Administration inherited what was known as Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), a 
document providing guidance for strategic nuclear doctrine that evolved from several 
major reviews and studies conducted between 1977-79, the most important being the 
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) Study headed by Leon Sloss.76 PD-59 \vas 
not a radical departure from previous targeting doctrines; rather it represented a 
further stage in the evolution of American strategic nuclear doctrine towards a refined 
war-fighting strategy, especially in the provision of more controlled and selective 
nuclear options in the SlOP)7 Quite predictably, the Reagan Administration 
undertook its own review of nuclear targeting policy in 1981, resulting in the 
formulation of a new SlOP (SIOP-6) taking effect on 1 October 1983. Military and 
Pipedream' in Margaret Blunden and Owen Greene (eds), Science and 
Mythology in the Making of Defence Policy, Brasseys Defence Publishers, 
London, 1989, pp.61-76. 
75 Stephen J. Cimbala, Extended Deterrence: The United States and NATO 
Europe, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1987, p.19. This view is shared by 
Philip Lawrence in his reply to Gerald Segal. See 'A Reply', Review of 
International Studies, 11(3), 1985, p.241. 
76 Jeffrey Richelson, 'PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization 
program' , lournal of Strategic Studies, 6(2), 1983, pp.128-129. 
77 For useful discussions of PD-59 see Desmond Ball, 'PD-59: A Strategic 
Critique', FAS Public Interest Report, October 1980, pp.5-6; and Milton 
Leitenberg, 'Presidential Directive (P.D.) 59: The United States Nuclear 
Weapon Targeting Policy', lournal of Peace Research, XVIII(4) , 1981, 
pp.309-317. 
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political leadership targets in the Soviet Union were officially designated as one of 
the four target groups, the other three being Soviet nuclear forces, general purpose 
forces and the Soviet economic and industrial base.78 
Secondly, following the ABM debate in the late 1960s, Ballistic Missile 
Defence was never prominent issue in American defence debates. The continuing 
official reluctance to embrace a damage limitation strategy through a nation-wide 
deployed ballistic missile defence had been the basis of Gray's criticism of extant 
U.S. nuclear strategy from the time of SIOP-5 in 1976, although he was wholly 
supportive of the trend towards greater flexibility and selectivity in targeting 
doctrine.79 On 23 March 1983, President Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), initially a five year research program to establish whether a non-
nuclear, multi-tiered, space-based defence providing complete protection for the 
American population was technologically feasible.8o Although the debate over SDI 
shifted from an emphasis on population defences to the desirability of point defences 
for ballistic missile sites, the National Command Authority and other si~ar targets, 
it did result in the first official directive for the American scientific community to find 
the means to protect the American population from nuclear missile attack. 81 
78 Desmond Ball, 'The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983', op .cit., p.80-81. 
79 See in particular Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: The Debate Moves On', 
RUSI Journal, 121, March 1976, pp.44-50; 'Presidential Directive 59: Flawed 
But Useful', Parameters, XI(I), March 1981, pp.29-37; Gray's contribution to 
'Debate and Discussion: New U.S. Nuclear Strategy', Baltimore Sun, 20 
September 1980, p.14; and 'Mobilization For High-Level Conflict: Policy 
Issues', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan (eds), The U.S. Defense 
Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and Priorities, Archon Books, 
Harnden, 1983, p.36-37. 
80 Two excellent collections of essays on the SDI debate can be found in Steven 
E. Miller and Stephen Van Era (eds), The Star Wars Controversy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1986; and Samuel F. Wells, Jr, and Robert S. 
Litwak (eds), Strategic Defenses and Soviet American Relations, Ballinger 
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass, 1987. 
81 Official guidance was provided in the policy document NSDD-119 of 6 
January 1984. 
27 
Thirdly, a new U.S. SlOP (SlOP-6F) came into effect on 1 October 1989.82 
While the new nuclear war plan is essentially a more refined version of previous 
targeting doctrines it represents, according to Desmond Ball and Robert Toth, the 
most far-reaching and important change 'in both the substance and structure of the 
U.S. strategic nuclear war plan since the preparation of SlOP-63 in 1961-62'.83 
Arguably the most controversial aspect of the new targeting doctrine is the emphasis 
placed on destroying the Soviet leadership, especially the prOVIsIon of prompt 
counter-leadership targeting options. The priority accorded counter- leadership 
targeting in SlOP-6F is unprecedented and raises a variety of important issues such as 
its likely impact on deterrence stability, its technological feasibility and its 
implications for nuclear war termination. SlOP-6F brings U.S. targeting doctrine 
further into line with Gray's strategic advocacy. 
Although the convergence between American nuclear strategy and Gray's 
theory of victory gradually accelerated during the 1980s, to a point where the U.S. 
appeared to be acquiring the military capability to defeat the Soviet Union in a 
protracted nuclear conflict, the essential requirements for American victory in nuclear 
war cannot be fulfilled today. The United States is neither capable of physically 
limiting the amount of destruction the Soviet Union could wreak upon the American 
homeland at any stage of a nuclear exchange, nor can it effectively target the essential 
assets of the Soviet state so as to ensure a political victory. American strategic 
doctrine as embodied in SlOP-6F falls far short of Gray's theory of victory in nuclear 
war. Gray has failed to have his preferred strategy - Damage Limitation for 
Deterrence and Coercion - converted into 'men, machines, organisation and 
operational plans' .84 Two important questions remain unanswered. What is the 
82 The most comprehensive discussion of SIOP-6F is Desmond Ball and Robert 
C. Toth, 'Revising the SlOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes', 
International Security, 14(4), Spring 1990, pp.65-92. 
83 Ibid., p.66. 
84 Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Ideas and Defense Policy: The Organizational 
Nexus' in R.A. Beaumont and M. Edmonds (eds), vVar in the Next Decade, 
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1974, p.90. 
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likelihood of the U.S. endorsing a theory of victory in nuclear war at some future 
date? And, are the technologies and operational requirements of Gray's nuclear war 
winning strategy attainable? A detailed response to these questions will occupy most 
of Chapter Two. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORY OF VICTORY UNDER ATTACK: 
CRITICISMS WITHIN THE STRATEGIC STUDIES 
COMMUNITY 
Colin Gray's 'Nuclear Strategy: The Case For a Theory of Victory' (1979) 
and 'Victory is Possible' (1980) have made a significant impact in debates on the 
direction of American nuclear strategy within the strategic studies community.1 This 
chapter will examine Gray's theory of victory as critiqued in strategic studies 
literature, including Gray's response to the various charges levelled against his thesis. 
The objective is to demonstrate that while the critics reveal political and technological 
problems in Gray's war-winning strategy and allege its negative impact on strategic 
stability, their arguments do not~ amount to an overwhelming case against Gray's 
theory of victory. Rather, the critique should be viewed as a loose collection of 
criticisms which fail to penetrate beneath the surface of Gray's reasoning. 
Consequently, Gray has been able to invoke unchallenged the assumptions of the 
theory of victory to repudiate the claims of his critics and present his thesis more 
vigorously. Taken together, the criticisms remain deficient because they leave 
unscathed a framework of assumptions and beliefs which provide the rationale for 
Gray's theory of victory. 
1 For attempts to pOSItIOn Gray's war-winning strategy in the spectrum of 
debates over nuclear strategy see Robert E. Osgood, The Nuclear Dilemma in 
American Strategic Thought, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988, pp.20-40, 73-
77; and P. Ifestos, Nuclear Strategy and European Security Dilemmas: 
Towards an Autonomous European Defense System, Avebury, Aldershot, 
1988, pp.140-165. An excellent discussion is Charles Glasser, 'Why Do 
Strategists Disagree About the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence', 
in Lyn Eden and Steve E. Miller (eds), Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the 
Strategic Nuclear Arms Race and Arms Control Debates, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1989, pp.109-172. For an interesting account by a well known 
Soviet analyst of American strategic issues see Genrikh Trofimenko, The U.S. 
Military Doctrine, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, pp.91-146. 
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The Theory of Victory: Political and Technological Feasibility 
Commentators critical of Gray's theory of victory in nuclear war fall into two 
groups. Some commentators derided Gray without supporting argumentation. For 
example, Richard Falk labelled Gray as 'the most unbalanced nuclear extremist that 
[is] currently loose in our midst'2 without any explanation. Arthur Cox described 
Gray's theory of victory as a 'concoction of fantasies based on sheer madness' adding 
that, 'the tragedy about Mr Gray and other Reagan strategists who share the same 
view is that they are taken seriously'.3 Like Falk, Cox did not substantiate his claims. 
Many commentaries in this group began their criticism of Gray from the 
premiss that nuclear deterrence could be defined only in terms of Mutual Assured 
Destruction. As a result, some critics failed to acknowledge that Gray offered his 
theory of victory as a rival theory of nuclear deterrence, or implied that Gray 
preferred war-fighting to deterrence.4 Others assumed that nuclear war-fighting 
strategies are incompatible with the requirements of stable deterrence.5 Although 
admitting the tenn theory of victory 'invited misunderstanding'6 and that: in 
retrospect, 'Victory is Possible' was a 'ghastly title' ,7 Gray should be defended 
against those commentators who failed to offer substantive criticism, choosing instead 
to ridicule and blatantly misrepresent his thesis. As Gray stated: 
2 Cited in R. Aldridge, First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy For Nuclear War, 
Pluto Press, London, 1983, p.10. 
3 Arthur Macy Cox, Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game, Times Books, 
New York, 1982, p.24. 
4 G. Herken, Counsels of War, Knopf, New York, 1985, p.312. It was clearly 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 that for Gray, deterrence and defence are mutually 
reinforcing. 
5 This type of misrepresentation pervades F. Barnaby, 'Will There be a Nuclear 
War', in F. Barnaby (ed.), Future War: Armed Conflict in the Next Decade, 
Michael Joseph, London, 1984, pp.26-43; and R. Aldridge, The Counterforce 
Syndrome: A Guide to US Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine, IPS, 
Washington, 1982. 
6 Colin S. Gray, 'Issues and Non-Issues in the Nuclear Policy Debate', op.cit. , 
p.48. 
7 James Lardner, 'The Call of the Hawk's Hawke', The Washington Post, 14 
May 1982, p.CI. 
A strategic analyst who argues that 'victory or defeat' is possible may 
be held to have invited misrepresentation, but that fact no more 
excuses the misrepresentation than leaving a window unlocked 
exonerates the burglar. 8 
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A more careful analysis of Gray's theory of victory gradually appeared in 
strategic studies literature. The critique has four components which together pose a 
creditable challenge to Gray's thesis. Gray's vision of a future war-winning nuclear 
strategy has been criticised on the basis that it was not, and would never be, feasible 
for domestic political reasons. There would be a lack of political support to fund the 
very expensive offensive and defensive systems needed to implement Gray's war-
winning strategy9 and it is doubtful if the American public would support a high level 
of domestic mobilisation for nuclear war. Paul Stockton has noted that the high cost 
and obtrusive nature of civil defence 'have fostered a long standing aversion towards 
such measures within the U.S. electorate'.1o Many factors presently lend support to 
this argument. For example, in the current climate of improving Soviet-American 
political relations it is unlikely the U.S. body politic would endorse the damage 
limi tation measures required for the operationalisation of Gray's theory of victory. In 
addition to ballistic missile defenses this would require both large and sustained 
investments in air and civil defence capabilities. There is considerable merit in 
Robert C. Gray's observation that: 
The advocates of war winning overestimate what the domestic political 
traffic seems likely to bear in the way of preparing for nuclear war.!1 
8 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: A Regrettable Necessity', SAIS Review, 
3(1), Winter-Spring 1983, p.2l. 
9 Phillip Bobbit, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of 
Nuclear Strategy, St Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p.133-138; Phillip 
Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton (eds), U.S. Nuclear 
Strategy: A Reader, Macmillan, London, 1989, pp.428-437. 
10 P. Stockton, Strategic Stability Between the Superpowers, Adelphi Paper 
No.213, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter 1986, 
p.56. 
11 R.C. Gray, 'The Reagan Nuclear Strategy', in Robert Travis Scott (ed.), The 
Race for Security, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1987, p.l 07. 
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Many critics adhered to the position that even if the political conditions 
favoured an attempt by the U.S. to adopt Gray's nuclear war-winning strategy as 
official strategic doctrine, enduring technological and operational difficulties would 
hinder all efforts to achieve strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Firstly, 
defending American population centres against long range nuclear missile strikes is 
widely judged to be impossible. President Reagan's SDI generated acrimonious 
debate over the technological feasibility of strategic defenses. Although supporters 
and critics of SDI gathered evidence to legitimise their respective claims, a large body 
of literature demonstrates conclusively that President Reagan's vision of 'rendering 
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete' is an illusion.12 
Secondly, Gray's theory of victory requires targeting the Soviet State 
apparatus to enhance pre-war deterrence and, if necessary, to enforce the demise of 
the Soviet Union in war. Such a targeting priority would be confronted with major 
planning and operational dilemmas. Targeting the essential assets of the Soviet State 
and bringing a nuclear conflict to an end are incompatible strategic objectives. 13 If 
key Soviet leadership centres are targeted and destroyed, with whom and with what 
does the United States negotiate an end to the conflict? If the United States executes 
a decapitating strike to sever the rigid claim of authority characteristic of a centrally 
controlled political system, how would it prevent massive and indiscriminate Soviet 
retaliatory strikes against the American homeland? Gray was willing to examine the 
problem of leadership targeting for war termination in his writings on the theory of 
12 For an early critical commentary on the proposed technologies of SDI see 
John Tirman (ed.), The Fallacy of Star Wars, Vintage Books, New York, 
1984. 
13 This thesis is explored at length in 1. Richelson, 'The Dilemmas of 
Counterpower Targeting', Comparative Strategy, 2(3), 1980, pp.223-237, and 
Stephen 1. Cimbala, 'Counter-command Attacks and War Termination' in 
Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), Strategic War Termination, Praeger, New York 
1986, pp.151-173. See also the useful discussion in 1. Clark, Limited Nuclear 
War: Political Theory and War Conventions, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 
1982, pp.176-201, and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and 
National Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp.87-88. 
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victory and displayed an acute understanding of the issues.14 He came to the 
conclusion that the U.S. should not strike at the Soviet political control structure in 
the initial stages of a nuclear war, instead this option should be reserved as an 
'ultimate penalty' if all other attempts to force war tennination upon the Soviet Union 
fail. 15 Gray's alleged solution to the irreconcilable goals of counter-command 
targeting and war termination remains problematic because if the Soviet leadership is 
destroyed as the final strategic objective, how does the United States negotiate an end 
to the war on favourable terms? 
Discussion on nuclear war tennination should proceed cautiously and 
conclusions be offered tentatively. Apart from the works of Herman Kahn16 and 
Thomas Schelling17 in the 1960s, there had been few studies of nuclear war 
tennination by the 1980s.18 Only in recent years have the theoretical and practical 
aspects of this issue been analysed in more detail.19 This includes studies that have 
examined whether the process by which conventional wars come to an end might be 
applicable to the future termination of nuclear war.20 Although the findings are 
14 Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, 'Victory is Possible', op.cit., pp.24-25; 
Colin S. Gray, 'Targeting Problems for Central War', op.cit., pp.183-186. 
15 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy and National Style', op.cit., p.113. 
16 H. Kahn, 'Issues of Thermonuclear War Tennination' in How Wars End 
(Special Editor, William T.R. Fox), The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vo1.392, November 1970, pp.133-182. 
17 T. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, 
pp.204-220. 
18 See in particular F. Ikle, Every War Must End, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1971. 
19 In addition to the collection of articles in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), Strategic 
War Termination, see Clark C. Abt, A Strategy For Terminating a Nuclear 
War, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985; S. Albert and E.C. Luck (eds), On the 
Endings of Wars, National University Publications, New York, 1986; George 
H. Quester, 'War Termination and Nuclear Targeting' in D. Ball and J. 
Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, op.cit., pp.285-305; P. Bracken, 
'War Tennination' in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. 
Zracket (eds), Managing Nuclear Operations, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC., 1987, pp.197-214; Robert G. Leahy, 'C3 for Strategic War 
Termination', Signal, 42(1), August 1988, pp.39-44; Stephen J. Cimbala and 
Joseph D. Douglas Jr. (eds), Ending a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers 
Prepared? Pergamon Brasseys, Washington, 1988; and Stephen J. Cin1bala, 
Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time, Praeger, New York, 1989. 
20 P. Keczkemeki, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958; 1. Clark, Nuclear Past, Nuclear 
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are incomplete the literature demonstrates that nuclear war tennination is a neglected 
field of study requiring more attention; there would be major difficulties acqulnng 
those weapon systems and C31 facilities necessary for terminating nuclear war; those 
works analysing conventional war endings are of limited value to the study of nuclear 
war termination; and nuclear war termination would cease to be an issue if a sizeable 
proportion of nuclear weapons exploded either on or over both the superpowers' 
homelands. 
The Soviet Union has effectively compounded the dilemma of Gray's 
targeting preferences by massively investing in the hardening, dispersal and 
proliferation of leadership targets. According to Ball and Toth targeting the Soviet 
S tate is physically impossible: 
The Soviet leadership cnS1S and war-time relocation network, is 
extremely extensive, complex, physically deep underground in most 
cases, and impenetrable to Western intelligence in significant 
aspects.2! 
There is also an assumption in Gray's argument that the U.S. would be able to neatly 
exclude the Soviet population from its nuclear targeting list. The reality would be 
different. According to David Hallenbach: 
The proposal of Colin Gray is virtually indistinguishable from MAD. 
If actually carried out [it seems] certain to produce a form of 
spasmodic or indiscriminate response and counter-response that would 
be impossible to distinguish from the failure of MAD.22 
Present: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Contemporary Strategy, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1985; and Leon V. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War 
Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1988. 
21 Desmond Ball and Robert Toth, 'Revising the SlOP: Taking War-Fighting to 
Dangerous Extremes', op.cit., p.88. 
22 D. Hallenbach, 'Ethics in Distress: Can There Be Just War in the Nuclear 
Age?', in W.V. O'Brien and J. Langan (eds), The Nuclear Dilemma and the 
Just War Tradition, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1986, p.25. See also 
McGeorge Bundy 'Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has 
Changed?', in The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Part 1, Adelphi Paper 
No.160, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Autumn 1980, 
pp.5-12; George H. Quester, 'Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has 
Come', Journal of Strategic Studies, 5(2), June 1982, pp.228-235; L. 
Wieseltier, Nuclear vVar, Nuclear Peace, op.cit., p.49. 
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Thirdly, Michael Howard has seriously questioned Gray's almost naive vision of a 
'postwar world order compatible with Western values'. Assuming that the political 
and operational conditions of Gray's war-winning strategy exist sometime in the 
future, Howard justifiably makes the following claim: 
The prospect of any regime in the least compatible with what Gray 
calls 'Western Values' emerging from a bloodbath ... is, to put it 
mildly, pretty remote.23 
During the mid 1980s, Gray was a harsh critic of strategic analysts who 
adhered to either Mutual Assured Destruction as the basis for stable deterrence or a 
variant of limited nuclear war-fighting, for their alleged inability to provide any 
'policy relevant' advice to American officials responsible for executing foreign 
policy.24 The criticisms presented above, however, amount to the claim that Gray's 
nuclear war-winning strategy is itself irrelevant to official debate over American 
strategic nuclear doctrine, at least for the 1990s, because the political, technological 
and operational conditions of the theory of victory are unattainable. Gray's strategic 
advocacy is, therefore, no more 'policy relevant' than Mutual Assured Destruction, 
norwithstanding his forceful argument to the contrary. 
Gray's Response: A Nuclear De-emphasis? 
How does Gray respond to these criticisms? What, if any thing, can be 
inferred from his writings? An overview of Gray's unfolding thesis on nuclear 
strategy from the mid 1970s reveals his fluctuating attitude towards the technological 
23 Michael E. Howard, 'On Fighting a Nuclear War', International Security, 
5(4), Spring 1981, pp.3-17. 
24 For example, in 1984 Gray argued that 'Bernard Brodie, Michael Howard, 
Desmond Ball and many others say wise things, but they do not say anything 
very useful to the officials who must provide policy guidance', in Nuclear 
Strategy and Strategic Planning, op.cit., p.35. For Gray's first examination of 
the relationship between strategic theory and the requirements of policy 
makers see 'The Practice of Theory in International Relations', Political 
Studies, XXII, 1974, pp.129-146. 
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and political feasibility of the theory of victory, which can be roughly divided into 
three periods. From 1974 to 1982, Gray indicated that the technologies for damage 
limitation would not be available for at least several decades and that a nuclear war-
winning strategy would be politically unacceptable in the United States. In 1976 
Gray stated: 
there is no way, in the short or medium term, in which the mutual 
hostage relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States 
can be upset. N either the defensive nor the offensive technologies that 
may be currently projected over the next decade and beyond ... carry 
any significant promise of being able to reduce expected casualties to a 
negligible leve1.25 
Furthermore at the peak of advocating his theory of victory, Gray repeatedly 
expressed the following negative assessment: 
A theory of victory, though valuable, is probably not practicable, given 
the improbability of the US body politic investing effectively in a 
capability for assured societal survival.26 
I am intensely skeptical over the willingness of the Reagan 
Administration to fund the defense programs that I favour. 27 
I remain skeptical whether any American administration will choose to 
develop a defense posture genuinely balanced between the offense and 
the defense.28 
Despite these expressed reservations, Gray's objective during this period was to 
establish the theoretical validity of his war-winning strategy, renew a debate over 
ballistic missile defence similar to the ABM debate of the late 1960S29 and lobby the 
U.S. defence community and government to invest in a damage limitation capability. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, Lexington Books, Lexington, 
1976, p.147. 
Colin S. Gray, Strategy and the MX, Critical Issues, Heritage Foundation, 
Washington, 1980, p.51. 
Colin S. Gray, 'Chacun a son gout', op.cit, p.65. 
Colin S. Gray, 'Forward' in Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S. 
Soviet Relations, op.cit., XIV. 
Colin S. Gray, 'A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense', Survival, 
XXIII(2), Marchi April 1981, p.60-71. 
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Over the 1983-1985 period, Gray was confident that a consensus was 
emerging in the U.S. over the importance of nuclear war-fighting strategies for 
deterrence and that the U.S. defence community would see the wisdom of balancing 
offensive threats 'with a plausible multitiered theory of defense for the U.S. 
homeland')O Gray went as far as to say that as the technology of strategic defence 
matures, 
the United States should be prepared to effect an orderly transition to a 
strategic force posture that would be balanced between offensive and 
defensive capabilities.31 
Gray's increasing optimism can be attributed to several factors including President 
Reagan's SDI and the Scowcroft Commission's endorsement of 'war-fighting 
deterrence' )2 
Within two years, however, a significant change in Gray's view concerning 
the feasibility of the theory of victory was apparent in his contributions to strategic 
studies literature. After 1986 there is a sudden shift in Gray's writings away from the 
theory of victory in nuclear war towards a U.S. strategy for victory in a global 
conventional war)3 The focus of Gray's recent thesis is the use of America's superior 
maritime capabilities (in concert with a strengthened NATO) to threaten the Soviet 
Union with a global protracted conflict at the conventional level it could not win.34 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning, op.cit., p.122. 
Ibid., p.126. 
See in particular the Report's assertion that 'deterrence ... requires military 
effectiveness', Report of the U.S. President's Commission on Strategic 
Forces, 6 April 1983, reproduced in full in Strategic Digest, XIII(8), August 
1983 pp.52l-540. 
The first sign of this change is Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics 
and the Defense of the vVest, National Strategy Information Centre, Inc., New 
York, 1986. Stephen Cimbala provides a useful summary of Gray's new 
thinking in Rethinking Nuclear Strategy, Scholarly Resources Inc., 
Wilmington, Delaware, 1988, p.107 and Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on 
Time, Praeger, New York, 1989, p.192. 
For the development and amplification of Gray's maritime strategy see, in 
addition to footnote 33, 'Maritime Strategy', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
112, February 1986, pp.34-43; 'Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy 
for a Maritime America', The National Interest, 4, Summer 1986, pp.24-36; 
'Western Security and the Pacific: A Geopolitical Perspective', NATO's 
Sixteen Nations, 32, April 1987, pp.42-47; 'Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: 
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Although the details of Gray's maritime strategy are peripheral to this discussion, it is 
important to highlight that U.S. strategic forces would playa fundamentally different 
role from the one assigned to them in his theory of nuclear victory. Gray now argues 
that long range nuclear missiles must be relegated to the role of counter-deterrence 
because the U.S. can no longer threaten the fIrst use of its nuclear weapons to support 
distant allies when the U.S. homeland is totally vulnerable to nuclear retaliation. As a 
counter-deterrent, U.S. strategic forces would allegedly deter the Soviet Union from 
escalating out of a global conventional conflict because to do so would invite nuclear 
retaliation against highly valued military and political assets in the Soviet Union. 
As long as the United States lacks the ability to limit the level of 
damage that it might suffer at home as a consequence of nuclear 
operations that escalated out of a theater conflict, U.S. strategic forces 
must be relegated to the status of shield, and not sword, of the 
republic.35 
One of the primary objectives of Gray's maritime strategy is to prevent Soviet-
American hostilities escalating to the use of nuclear weapons, especially homeland 
exchanges. This requires counter-deterrence to function perfectly for the duration of 
the conflict.36 
35 
36 
The Implications for NATO", Naval War College Review, 30, Winter 1987, 
pp.8-19; 'NATO: Time to Call it a Day?', The National Interest, Winter 
1987/88, pp.13-26; 'The Maritime Strategy - 1988: Bad Strategy or Good 
Deterrent', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1988, pp.54-61; The 
Geopolitics of Superpower, University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 1988; 
'Ocean and Continent in Strategy', Comparative Strategy, 7(4), 1988, pp.439-
444; 'The Maritime Strategy in U.S.-Soviet Relations', Naval War College 
Review, XLII(l), Winter 1989, pp.7-18; 'The Maritime Strategy is Not New', 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 116(1), January 1990, pp.66-72; Colin S. 
Gray and Roger W. Barnett (eds), Seapower and Strategy, Naval Institute 
Press, Annapolis, 1989; and 'U.S. Naval Power and Competitive Grand 
Strategy', International Defense Review, 23(3), 1990, pp.255-258. 
Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Priorities and U.S. Options: Escalation and Extended 
War', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.), The Soviet Challenge in the 1990s, Praeger, 
New York, 1989, p.131. 
As Gray recently stated 'a country that is winning a conventional war can have 
no motive to employ nuclear weapons, while a country that is losing will 
recognize that nuclear use would make a bad situation very much worse', in 
'Seapower and Landpower', Colin S. Gray and Roger VV. Barnett (eds), 
Seapower and Strategy, op.cit., p.23. 
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While space precludes an extended commentary on Gray's maritin1e strategy, 
two weaknesses must be identified. Firstly, Gray fails to address the fundamental 
differences between his preferred maritime strategy and America's present maritime 
strategy enunciated by Admiral James D. Watkins in January 1986.37 America's 
forward offensive maritime strategy generated controversy over its aim to destroy 
with conventional weapons, Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile carrying 
submarines (SSBNs) in their home waters in the initial stages of a conflict.38 Critics 
were adamant that an attempt to destroy the Soviet Union's sea based nuclear 
deterrent would carry the real risk of inadvertent nuclear war at sea,39 with possible 
escalation to all out nuclear war. 40 Secondly, the intemallogic of Gray's maritime 
strategy can be questioned. He asserts that the Soviet Union would not escalate to the 
nuclear level because of America's nuclear counter-deterrent. The success of 
counter-deterrence, however, has been overstated. The Soviet Union might be forced 
into the position of seeking a more favourable war outcome by resorting to nuclear 
weapons.41 If Gray's maritime str'lteg)f was implemented there would be a definite 
possibility of hostilities crossing the nuclear threshold. Gray is vulnerable, therefore, 
to the types of criticisms he levelled at supporters of strategic stability through MAD 
37 James D. Watkins, P.X. Kelly and John F. Lehman, Jr. 'The Maritime 
Strategy', supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 112, January 1986. 
38 There is a vast literature on U.S. Maritime Strategy. For a good representation 
of the lively debate see John J. Mearsheimer, 'A Strategic Misstep: The 
Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe', International Security, 11 (2), 
Fall 1986, pp.3-57; and Linton F. Brooks, 'Naval Power and National 
Security: The Case For the Maritime Strategy', International Security, 11(2), 
Fall 1986, pp.58-88. 
39 For an excellent discussion of the risk of nuclear war at sea see Desmond Ball, 
'Nuclear War at Sea', International Security, 10(3), Winter 1985/86, pp.3-31. 
40 This thesis is developed in Barry R. Posen, 'U.S. Maritime Strategy: A 
Dangerous Game', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 43(7), September 1987, 
pp.24-28; and D. Hodgkinson, Inadvertent Nuclear War: The U.S. Maritime 
Strategy and the Cult of Offensive, Working Paper No.159, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, ANU, July 1988. 
41 The possibility of Soviet escalation to the use of either tactical or strategic 
nuclear weapons at sea cannot be discounted. See Gordon H. McCormick and 
Mark E. Miller, 'American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear Weapons in Soviet 
Naval Planning', Orbis, 25(2), Summer 1981, pp.351-367; and Donald F. 
Daniel, 'The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea', Survival, 
XXIX(4), July/August 1987, pp.318-335. 
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because the United States would be risking nuclear war without being able to either 
control the escalation process or limit the amount of destruction the Soviet Union 
could visit upon the American homeland. 
Is it possible to determine what influenced the shift in Gray's theoretical 
writings on strategy after 1986? A careful reading of Gray indicates that the main 
factor forcing him away from a continued emphasis on victory in nuclear war was a 
falling optimism concerning the likelihood of the U.S. embracing a damage limitation 
package consisting of strategic, air and civil defences. In 1986, in sharp contrast to 
the tone of his writings between 1983-1985, Gray stated that: 
... it would be prudent for American planners and commentators in the 
1980s to recognize the plain aversion in Western political culture to ... 
a bid for the restoration of superiority, as well as the improbability of 
its technical accomplishment under current, peacetime circum-
stances.42 
This falling optimism represented the culmination of Gray's critique of U.S. strategic 
culture and the alleged impact of that culture on America's approach to problems of 
national security.43 
Immediate questions arise: does Gray's maritime strategy supplant his theory 
of victory in nuclear war? Does it indicate that Gray now believes his theory of 
victory in nuclear war to be obsolete? Readers of Gray in 1986 may have been 
uncertain as to his real stance on the theory of victory because at the same time the 
above passage was written (indicating Gray's losing faith in the likelihood of strategic 
defences becoming politically in vogue or technologically feasible), Gray's seven 
42 Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the vVest, 
op.cit., p.68. 
43 For the development of Gray's thesis on American strategic culture see his 
'Force Planning, Political Guidance and the Decision to Fight ', Military 
Review, LVIII(4), April 1978, pp.12-14; 'National Style in Strategy: The 
American Example', International Security, 6(2), Fall 1981, pp.21-47; 
'Comparative Strategic Culture', Parameters, X14(4), Winter 1984, pp.26-33; 
Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op.cit., Chapter 2; and 'National 
Signatures in Defense', Defense Science and Electronics, 7(1), January 1988, 
pp.24-26. 
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year advocacy of the theory of victory reached its apogee with the appearance of 
Nuclear Strategy and National Style in 1986. 
The strongest single policy arg~ment in this book is that U.S. strategic 
nuclear planning should be as attentive to the protection of the U.S. 
homeland as it is to the potential destruction of Soviet assets.44 
It can be clearly demonstrated that Gray's focus on maritime strategy after 1986 does 
not alter in any way his present belief in both the strategic need for the U.S. to adopt a 
theory of victory in nuclear war and the technological feasibility of damage 
limitation. This claim is supported by the following evidence: 
a. Gray's continuing endorsement of strategic defenses after 198645 
together with his strong support for Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons 
and the need for the U.S. to develop a 'space warfare' doctrine;46 
b. his recent appeal to the U.S. defence, community to develop an 
operational strategic nuclear doctrine relating means to ends;47 
44 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op.cit., IX. 
45 See Gray's 'The Transition From Offense to Defense', The Washington 
Quarterly, 9(3), Summer 1986, pp.59-72; 'Deterrence and Strategic Defense: 
A Positive View', in Craig Snyder (ed.), The Strategic Defense Debate: Can 
'Star Wars' Make Us Safe? The University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 1986, pp.169-182; 'Denting the Shield, Blunting 
the Sword: The Soviet War Against the S.D.!.', Defense Science 2003 +4, 
No.6, December 1985-January 1986, pp.11-19; and 'The Simplistic Thinking 
on SDI is no Debate at all', Los Angeles Times, 5 September 1988, Part II, p.5. 
46 For the development of Gray's thesis on space warfare and doctrine see his 
American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems and 
Arms Control, Abt Books, Cambridge, Mass. 1982; 'The Military Uses of 
Space', Survival XXV(5) September/October 1983, pp.194-204; 'The 
Strategic Nuclear Policy of the Reagan Administration: Trends, Problems and 
the Potential Relevance of Space Based Laser Weapons', in Keith B. Payne 
(ed.), Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1983, pp.189-218; 'U.S. Military Space Policy' in Adam 
M. Garf"mkle (ed.) Global Perspectives on Arms Control, Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1984, pp.133-144; 'Why an ASAT Treaty is a Bad Idea', 
Aerospace America, 22(4), April 1984, pp.70-74; 'Space Anns Control: A 
Skeptical View', Air University Review, 37(1), November/December 1985, 
pp.50-55; 'Space Warfare - Part I, The Need for Doctrine', lVational Defense, 
LXXII(434), January 1988, pp.25-28; 'Space Warfare - Part II, Principles, 
Weapons and Tactics', National Defense, LXXII(435), February 1988, pp.39-
43; and 'ASAT For Space Control - Wanted, Yet Missing', Defense Science, 
7(6), June 1988, pp.38-41. 
47 Colin S. Gray, 'U.S. Strategic Culture: Implications For Defense Technology', 
in Asa A. Clark and John F. Lilley (eds), Defense Technology, Praeger, New 
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c. his belief that the present condition of mutual vulnerability is only a 
passing phase in the long tenn strategic relationship between the 
superpowers; 48 
d. his recent claim that the concept of victory in nuclear war 'remains 
very important for domestic politics, for purposive defense planning, 
and for deterrence;49 and 
e. the absence of any published material by Gray indicating a revision of 
the strategic arguments underpinning the theory of victory. 
In June 1988 Gray stated, in relation to his theory of victory, that 'my strategic 
reasoning qua strategic reasoning, has not altered'.50 It can be safely argued that 
Gray's present position on the theory of victory in nuclear war, as a theory of nuclear 
deterrence, is the one presented in his Nuclear Strategy and National Style (1986). 
The Theory of Victory and Strategic Stability 
Nuclear war-fighting strategies, including Gray's theory of victory, have been 
criticised on the basis that they erode the stability of nuclear deterrence in either one 
of two ways. The inclusion of discriminate and selective nuclear options in the SlOP 
for controlled nuclear war together with accurate counterforce ICBMs, could make 
nuclear war more thinkable and, therefore, more likely. In a military confrontation 
- with the Soviet Union, resorting to nuclear weapons might appear an attractive option 
to U.S. Policy makers.51 A more convincing argument is that a U.S. capability to 
limit damage at home through a combination of offensive strikes at Soviet long range 
48 
49 
50 
51 
York, 1989, pp.31-48; 'Nuclear Strategy: What is True, What is False, What is 
Arguable', Comparative Strategy, 9(1), 1990, pp.7-32. 
Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Deterrence and Technological Change: Retrospect 
and Prospect' in R. Kolkowicz (ed.), The Logic of Nuclear Terror, Allen and 
Unwin, London 1987, pp ..... 
Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic De-escalation', in Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. 
Douglass Jr. (eds), Ending a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? 
Pergamon-Brasseys, Washington, 1988, footnote 18, page 76. 
Cited from private correspondence between author and Colin Gray dated June 
28 1988. 
Louis Rene Beres, 'Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States 
Imperative', Alternatives, 8(2), Fall 1982, p.158. 
--
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nuclear missiles and the deployment of active and passive defences would lead to 
what Thomas Schelling described as the 'Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack' .52 
During an intense crisis, the Soviet Union would have a strong incentive to pre-empt 
so as to destroy as many U.S. ICBMs in their silos and maximise the penetration of 
U.S. defensive technologies. This could significantly limit the amount of damage to 
Soviet society and facilitate post war recovery. Similarly, with the knowledge that a 
Soviet pre-emptive strike would be advantageous, the U.S. incentive to pre-empt 
would be strengthened because of the advantages to be gained by striking first. 
The 'crisis instability' charge has been further developed. Robert Glasser 
argues that even if it could be demonstrated that the Soviet Union might refrain from 
pre-empting on the basis that America's land based ICBM force was both 
invulnerable and capable of retaliating against highly valued Soviet targets, Soviet 
pre-emption might still be considered. 
For the USSR, a post-war world in which neither nation survived 
might be preferable to one in which only the United States survived.53 
Glasser is saying that psychological and cognitive pressures during an intense crisis 
would possibly be more of an influence on a decision to pre-empt than a rational 
assessment of net gains and losses.54 According to Donald Hanson and Ken Booth, 
war-winning strategies increase the risk of nuclear war in other ways. They argue that 
by advertising a strategy of prevailing in nuclear war and a willingness to acquire the 
requisite offensive and defensive systems, the U.S. would greatly increase the level of 
Soviet anxiety. Whereas Gray contended that increasing the level of Soviet anxiety 
would strengthen deterrence, Hanson and Booth believe this would either induce 
52 T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1960, chapter 9. 
53 R. Glasser, Nuclear Pre-emption and Crisis Stability, 1985-1990, Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence No.37, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1986, p.19. 
54 R. Glasser, Pre-emption in the Nuclear Age, PhD Dissertation, The Australian 
National University, 1988, especially Part IV 'Nuclear Pre-emption: 
Prognoses and Responses', pp.320-358. 
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recklessness in Soviet behaviour or, more than likely, cause a sharp downturn In 
Soviet-American political relations.55 
An additional instability charge levelled at Gray's theory of victory is that it 
would lead to a spiralling anns race by provoking the Soviet Union to offset 
America's drive for strategic superiority. This would exacerbate the already strained 
political relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and lead to the 
development of offensive and defensive weapon systems capable of destroying each 
other's retaliatory or second strike force of ICBMs. According to Andrew Mack, 
theories of victory 'create powerful incentives for building more, rather than fewer 
nuclear weapons' .56 In summary, Gray's theory of victory has been criticised on the 
basis that, if translated into official American strategic nuclear doctrine, it would 
generate both 'crisis' and 'anns race' instabilities. 
For nearly fifteen years, Gray has fiercely contested the instability charges 
against war-fighting and war-winning nuclear strategies. He believes the cnSlS 
instability argument is based on a misguided theory of strategic stability.57 Gray is 
. 
adamant that a U.S. theory of victory in nuclear war would not increase the risk of 
Soviet nuclear pre-emption for one important reason. The Soviet Union would not 
initiate a strategic nuclear campaign if it could be denied its war time objectives or 
brought to the brink of political defeat via an intelligent American war plan that 
threatened the control apparatus of the Soviet State and its military forces. Gray's 
response to the arms race instability charge is that with the mix of offensive and 
defensive systems required for the theory of victory to become operationally feasible, 
the Soviet Union would eventually seek to bargain away its ICBMs in return for 
55 D. Hanson, 'Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?', International Security, 
7(3), 1982/83, pp.61-83; K. Booth, 'Nuclear Deterrence and "World War III": 
How Will History Judge?', in Roman Kolkowicz (ed.), The Logic of Nuclear 
Terror, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 1987, pp.251-281. 
56 A. Mack, 'Conclusions: The Future of Anns Control' in D. Ball and A. Mack 
(eds), The Future of Arms Control, op.cit., p.310. 
57 Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', Daedalus, 109(4), Fall 
1980, pp.125-154. 
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major concessions from the U.S. This is because the Soviet Union's long range 
nuclear weapons would no longer be able to fulfil their primary war time missions. 
Gray's argument is far from convincing. He provides no evidence to 
demonstrate that the Soviet Union would respond in the way he suggests, and 
overstates the influence (if any) of American strategic nuclear force developments on 
the processes which have led the Soviet Union to modernise its ICBM force over the 
past 20 years. Just as Gray was critical during the 1970s of the 'Action-Reaction' 
explanation for arms race behaviour between states,58 there is no reason to believe 
that the Soviet Union \vould react to an American drive for offensive strategic 
superiority by bargaining away its own ICBMs. By using Gray's logic, the Soviet 
Union would more than likely try to subvert U.S. strategy by acqulnng more 
offensive \veapons.59 
I 
Gray's conception of how to retain a semblance of stability in Soviet-
American strategic relations - by the U.S. possessing the means to defeat the Soviet 
Union in war - is more problematic. Being attentive to the structure of Gray's 
argumentation exposes, in the words of Donald Hanson, 'a perplexing blend of 
internal strain, ambiguity and question-begging on a very large scale'.6O A careful 
reading of Gray reveals inconsistencies in the development of his thesis. Over the 
course of a decade, Gray embraced conflicting notions of strategic stability to 
accommodate the changing fortunes of weapons systems which would be an integral 
part of his war-winning strategy. Gray's ardent support of the MX ICBM will now be 
used as an example. 
58 Colin S. Gray, 'Action and Reaction in the Nuclear Arms Race', op.cit., 
pp.16-26; 'The Arms Race Phenomenon', World Politics, XXIV(l), October 
1971, pp.39-79; 'The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing', vVorld 
Politics, XXVI(l), October 1973, pp.207-233; 'How Does the Nuclear Arms 
Race Work?', Cooperation and Conflict, IX, 1974, pp.285-295. Gray's 
critique of 'Action-Reaction' culminated with The Soviet-American Arms 
Race,op.cit. 
59 John Bayliss, 'Alliance Reform' in Ken Booth and John Bayliss, Britain, 
NATO and Nuclear vVeapons: Alternative Defence Versus Alliance Reform, 
Macmillan, London, 1989, p.339. 
60 D. Hanson, 'Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?', op.cit., p.72. 
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During the mid 1970s, the increasing theoretical vulnerability of U.S. 
Minuteman missiles to a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike became the most 
controversial strategic issue within the United States.61 There was widespread 
concern that a 'window of vulnerability' would open in the mid 1980s to be exploited 
both militarily and politically by the Soviet Union.62 The window of vulnerability 
thesis was the driving force behind the case for a follow-on ICBM such as MX. Gray 
advanced the most sophisticated rationale for MX.63 Between 1971 and 1982, 
however, Gray's support for the MX ICBM was contingent on the system being 
deployed in one of the many mobile (and hence survivable) basing options reviewed 
by the U.S. during this period64 and used only as a second strike counterforce weapon 
after the fIrst nuclear exchange. He was convinced that a non-survivable MX, each 
carrying ten highly accurate MIRVed warheads, would be a lucrative target increasing 
I 
the risk of Soviet nuclear pre-emption during a crisis. As early as 1971, Gray stated: 
This author shares the general Western belief that pre-emptive 
capabilities are de-stabilizing. Their acquisition can easily be mistaken 
for a bid for superiority and their maintenance would require a 'lJair 
trigger' reaction that both increases the risk of accidental and 
miscalculated launch and could serve to lower the threshold beyond 
which lies general nuclear war.65 
By 1975 Gray held the view that: 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
... the follow-on ICBM concept, the MX, will have to be deployed 
largely in a mobile mode ... by the mid 1980s it will hardly seem 
Donald Snow claimed that the theoretical vulnerability of Minuteman Missiles 
'is one of the most raging controversies in the contemporary defense debate', 
The Nuclear Future: Towards a Strategy of Uncertainty, The University of 
Alabama Press, Alabama, 1983, p.35. 
P. Nitze, 'Deterring Our Deterrent', Foreign Policy, No.25, Winter 1976-77, 
pp.195-210. 
See 'The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?' op.cit., pp.775-776. 
Close to 30 ICBM basing schemes were examined over the period spanning 
the 1960s and 1970s. Gray ultimately favoured the multiple Protective 
Structure (MPS) concept for MX basing. See U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, MX ICBM: Multiple Protective 
Structure (MPS) Basing and Arms Control, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 18 
April 1979, pp.269-384. 
Colin S. Gray, 'Security Through SALT?', op.cit., p.10. 
...... 
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sensible to deploy the next generation of missiles in a basing mode that 
is already very vulnerable.66 
In 1978 Gray told his readers that: 
Critics of a major American hard-target counter-force capability such 
as the MX ICBM have an excellent case to argue if that capability 
were to remain vulnerable to Soviet strategic strikes.67 
..+7 
In other words, MX deployed in fixed silos 'appears to be precluded by common 
sense. An MX in a silo is as vulnerable as a Minuteman III in a silo'. 68 The 
following year, Gray was more forthright in stating that MX would not receive his 
endorsement if deployed in a vulnerable basing mode, such as fixed ICBM silos.69 
In tenns of crisis stability, the United States is better off with 
Minuteman III in silos than it would be with MXs in silos. The Soviet 
incentive to strike at silo housed MX should be greater than the 
incentive to strike at Minuteman.?o 
Again, in 1982 Gray explained that it was not difficult to understand why the Senate 
Armed Services Committee denied the Department of Defence the option of 
deploying MX in fixed silos: 
Vulnerable high value military assets, in a time of extreme tension, 
probably would function more as a lightning rod or incentive for 
attack, than as a deterrent.?1 
Gray was also scathing of the suggestion that the U.S. could adopt a Launch on 
Warning (LOW) policy if its ICBM force was housed in vulnerable silos.?2 This 
66 Colin S. Gray, 'SALT II and the Strategic Balance', British Journal of 
International Studies, October 1975, p.206. 
67 Colin S. Gray, 'The MX Debate', op.cit., p.107. 
68 Ibid., p.111. 
69 Colin S. Gray, 'The MX ICBM: Why We Need It', Air Force Magazine, 
62(8), August 1979, pp.66-71. 
70 Colin S. Gray, 'Soviet Strategic Systems: Implications For the U.S. Deterrent 
Posture', in L. Goure, William G. Hyland and Colin S. Gray, The Emerging 
Strategic Environment: Implications For Ballistic Missile Defense, Institute 
For Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., Cambridge, Mass. 1979, p.66. 
71 Colin S. Gray, 'Why Does the United States Need ICBMs? ', NATO's Fifteen 
Nations, 27, August/September 1982, p.82. 
72 Gray believed that for the United States to launch its ICBMs on positive 
warning and assessment of a Soviet nuclear attack 'would represent an all-
I 
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policy would enable the U.S. to release its ICB1rls on confinnation of a Soviet missile 
attack. 
A turning point in the debate over Minuteman vulnerability arrived when 
President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) 
recommended in its 1983 report that 100 MX missiles be deployed in existing 
(vulnerable) Minuteman ill silos. This recommendation was made on the basis that 
deterrence stability would not be weakened because the two remaining legs of the 
strategic triad - SLBMs and manned bombers - were independently survivable. After 
1983, Gray welcomed the Scowcroft Commission's endorsement of MX and strongly 
supported immediate deployment of MX in Minuteman silos.73 In doing so, however, 
Gray offered strategic arguments which flatly contradicted his explicitly stated view 
. before 1983. Gray rebuked all suggestions that MX deployed in fixed silos would 
generate Soviet and American fears of pre-emption; he was adamant that silo housing 
of MX would not lead to a 'Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack'. Ironically, one of 
the main arguments used by Gray to defend his position was that the United States 
could adopt a Launch on Waming policy - the very policy he ridiculed in the late 
1970s.74 By 1987, Gray was arguing that the deployment of MX in vulnerable silos 
would provide the U.S. with a secure second strike counterforce capability to 
strengthen deterrence, whereas before 1983 he strongly argued that silo housing of 
MX would increase the risk of nuclear war via fears of pre-emption. The two 
positions are clearly incompatible. 
time nadir in strategic thought and planning (against what do we launch?)" in 
'The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?', op.cit., pp.780-781. 
73 Colin S. Gray, 'Abiding Realities and Strategic Needs', Air Force Magazine, 
66(7), July 1983, pp.73-76; Colin S. Gray, Keith B. Payne, and Barry R. 
Schneider (eds), Missiles For the Nineties: ICBMs and Strategic Policy, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1984; and Colin S. Gray, Missiles Against War: 
The ICBM Debate Today, Issues in National Security, National Institute for 
Public Policy, Fairfax Virginia, 1985. 
74 Colin S. Gray, 'ICBMs and Deterrence: The Controversy Over Prompt 
Launch', Journal of Strategic Studies, 10(3), September 1987, pp.285-309. 
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This example has demonstrated how Gray manipulated strategic arguments to 
maintain his support for the MX ICBM in light of the Scowcroft Commission 
Report's recommendations concerning MX deployment. Gray's continuing support 
for MX, therefore, has not been based on a consistent or clearly defined view of 
deterrence and strategic stability but rather on his obsession with the counterforce 
prowess of MX, especially its ability to promptly destroy Soviet leadership targets 
and Soviet long range nuclear weapons. 
CHAPTER THREE 
ASSESSING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF 
THE THEORY OF VICTORY 
In Chapter One it was demonstrated that Gray presents his theory of victory in 
nuclear war foremost as a theory of nuclear deterrence superior to stable deterrence 
through Mutual Assured Destruction, and as the only operational strategy nuclear 
doctrine from which the United States could hope to achieve some version of 
'victory' or favourable war termination in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, it was argued that Gray attempts to justify his theory of victory by 
appealing to a chain of strategic logic which allegedly underpins that theory. The 
strategic logic used by Gray between 1979 and 1986 to explicate the theory of victory, 
conceals an edifice of assumptions and political beliefs that are more controversial 
than Gray would otherwise have his readers believe. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the rigid structure or framework of assumptions supporting Gray's strategic 
advocacy and to offer a broad critique of those assumptions so as to arrive at a more 
complete understanding of his theory. The starting premiss of this chapter has been 
clearly stated by John Garnett. 
The assumptions which underpin a good deal of contemporary 
strategic thought are rarely articulated, and may not even be 
appreciated by those who actually engage in strategic analysis ... 
Nevertheless, just as an argument is only as strong as the premises 
upon which it is founded, so a body of strategic analysis is only as 
sound as the assumptions on which it is based. 1 
Colin Gray's World View: Realpolitik and Soviet Style in Strategy 
An exclusive focus on the two 'theory of victory' articles (1979 and 1980) 
provides at best an incomplete understanding of the assumptions of the theory of 
victory. Over two decades, Gray has written on so many overlapping themes that the 
1 John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions', in J. Baylis, K. Booth, 
J. Garnett and P. Williams (eds), Contemporary Strategy: Theories and 
Policies, Croom Helm, London, 1975, p.9. 
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assumptions are developed gradually and in a disjointed form. While Gray does not 
deliberately conceal from readers the assumptions of his thesis, they can be difficult 
to detect by virtue of his style of writing and method of scholarship. As Lawrence 
Freedman stated: 
It is part of Gray's style to generate a barrage of assertions and 
generalizations, often without giving the reader a chance to assess 
properly their meaning, validity or implications... Instead of being 
guided through an argument, sometimes one feels one is being set up 
for an ambush.2 
A perusal of Gray's strategic/theoretical writings from the early 1970s reveals a fixed 
hierarchy of assumptions that could be described as a 'world view', a view that 
determines the course of his strategic advocacy to the present day. 
Firstly, at some risk of over-simplification, Gray adheres to what may be 
tenned a crude Realist view of international relations especially concerning the 
central actors or players in the international arena; the major issues to be considered 
for analysis; and the underlying causes of war and peace. In this discussion, the term 
Realism refers specifically to Gray's belief that the international system of sovereign 
states is pennanently anarchical; that states are the central and most important actors 
on the world stage; that a state's quest for power is the defining characteristic of 
international relations; and that, through countervailing military power and alliance 
formations, states seek to preserve a balance of power as the basis for international 
stability) Consequently, international relations is characterised by great power 
rivalry and conquest, clearly traceable to the Peloponnesian War.4 For a detailed 
representation of Gray's view of international relations one need look no further than 
2 Lawrence Freedman, 'The Strategists Vocation', op.cit., p.171. 
3 These views are clearly expressed by Gray in 'Foreign Policy - There is No 
Choice', Foreign Policy, 24, Fall 1976, pp.115-127; The Geopolitics of the 
Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution, op.cit. 
4 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Penguin, London, 1954. 
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the works of E.H. Carr, Nicholas Spykman and Hans Morgenthau,5 works frequently 
acknowledged and praised by Gray in his writings. 
Gray's clear allegiance to the major tenets of Classical Realism - Power 
Politics and the Balance of Power - has influenced the way he characterises 
international relations in the nuclear age. For example, Gray discounts the thesis that 
the advent of atomic and subsequently thermonuclear weapons has fundamentally 
altered the practice of statecraft or revolutionised traditional military strategy. In the 
absence of any structural changes to both the anarchic international system and the 
political rivalry dividing East and West, Gray argues that international relations and 
statecraft will be conducted in the same way as had been the practice long prior to the 
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Gray believes that nuclear weapons 
have been grafted on to the traditional ways states conduct their affairs . 
... statecraft with nuclear weapons looks very much like statecraft 
without nuclear weapons... 'The rules of the road' in international 
politics are more restrictive than previously was the case, but the same 
activities are pursued; the basic competitive character of international 
politics has accommodated nuclear energy.6 
The second tier of Gray's 'world view' consists of a clearly defined thesis on 
the dynamics of Soviet-American strategic and political rivalry within the boundaries 
of the international system described above. Gray argues that the Soviet Union and 
the United States are locked into a permanent ideological adversary relationship that 
can only change its present course following a revolution in international politics 
originating from a transformation of either the present Soviet or American social and 
5 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study 
of International Relations, Macmillan, London, 1939; Nicholas Spykman, 
America's Strategy in the world: The United States and the Balance of Power, 
Archon, Hamden, Conn., 1970 (first published in 1942); Hans 1. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, New York, 
Knopf, 1948. 
6 Colin S. Gray, 'Across the Nuclear Divide - Strategic Studies, Past and 
Present', International Security, 2(1), Summer 1977, p.32. This argument is 
also forcefully presented in Colin S. Gray, 'The "Racing Syndrome" and the 
Strategic Balance', in L.L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power, 
Macdonalds and Jane, London, 1976, pp.29-30. 
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social and political systems. Gray maintains that the struggle is not based only on 
ideological differences. The two major powers are rivals 'by virtue of their joint 
preeminence in international politics'. Political competition, therefore, 'would 
characterise Soviet-American relations' in spite of their respective political systems.7 
What is the basis for Gray's claim of a pennanent East-West political 
struggle? It is argued that the Soviet Union is ideologically committed to an 
unremitting political struggle with an antagonistic social system.8 Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union's major external security condition is the existence of the United States 
'as an independent security-organising power in world politics'.9 Gray repeated this 
argument when he stated: 
Aside from ideological considerations, the United States is the Soviet 
Union's mortal foe because of its very existence as the preeminent 
centre of countervailing power, which the Soviet Union does not 
control. 10 
Just as the U.S. is the main Soviet adversary because of its very existence as an 
opposing superpower, Gray similarly claims that 'it is the very character of the Soviet 
. . 
State that is the proximate U.S. security problem')1 Consequently the United States 
must view the Soviet Union as a pennanent and hostile adversary and maximise every 
opportunity to contain and, if necessary, physically constrain through the employment 
of force, Soviet power and influence. Gray is essentially arguing that because the 
Soviet Union has no choice but to wage an inalienable political struggle against the 
West, especially reducing American influence in Europe and its periphery, the United 
States likewise has no choice but to fulfil the duty of containing and balancing Soviet 
7 Ibid., p.38. 
8 See Colin S. Gray, 'The End of SALT? Purpose and Strategy in U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Negotiations', op.cit., p.41, and 'Who's Afraid of the Cruise 
Missile?', Orbis, 21(3), Fall 1977, p.524. 
9 Colin S. Gray, 'International Order and American Power', Air University 
Review, XXXV(6), September/October 1984, p.28. 
10 Colin S. Gray, 'Planning For U.S. Security Interests', U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 110(12), December 1984, pA2. 
11 Colin S. Gray, '''Dear Voter": An Open Letter to the American Electorate', Air 
Force Magazine, 63(10), October 1980, p.54. 
, ' 
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power. Soviet-American political and hence military competition is for Gray a 
normal and unalterable state of affairs reflecting the true nature of international 
relations. 
A more complete picture of Gray's 'world view' begins to emerge from what 
is perhaps the most controversial assumption of his theory of victory; that the Soviet 
Union is best described as an insecure empire driven by an expansionist ideology to 
attain the ultimate goal of global hegemony.12 During the 1970s, Gray became 
increasingly critical of U.S. civilian strategists for debating the technical criteria for 
strategic stability, supposedly resulting in the fonnation of policies based on a 
fictitious adversary and that mirror-imaged the salient weaknesses of American 
strategic culture. According to Gray, the path to the formulation of a sensible national 
security policy and accompanying military strategy lies with a 
careful ... assessment of the stable elements of an identifiable Soviet 
political-strategic culture and style of behaviour in international 
affairs.13 
The beginnings of what may be tenned Gray's 'Soviet threat thesis' is evident in his 
mid-1970s assertion that the Soviet Union rejected the Western concept of strategic 
stability and was embarking on a massive military build-Up signalling a bid for 
strategic superiority over the United States. When Gray was preoccupied with 
advocating the theory of victory between 1979 and 1982, his interpretation of Soviet 
strategic culture matured into an articulate thesis consisting of two important 
arguments. 
Firstly, a careful reading of Russian history and culture provides unmistakable 
evidence that the Soviet Union's 'fIrm, indeed unalterable, commitment to the long 
term struggle for global hegemony' is attributable to a 'malign combination of 
12 This thesis is explored at length in Colin S. Gray 'Reflections on Empire: The 
Soviet Connection', Military Review, 62(1), January 1982, pp.2-13, and Colin 
S. Gray and Rebecca V. Strode, 'The Imperial Dimensions of Soviet Military 
Power', Problems of Communism, XXX(6), November-December 1981, pp.1-
15. 
13 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, op.cit., pA2. 
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Russian imperialism and Soviet ideology' .14 Gray describes the Soviet Union as an 
insecure empire. Such a label has three related components: 
a. as an imperial power the Soviet Union defines its own security In 
terms of the insecurity of all other powers; 
b. there is no limit to Soviet global ambitions. It is impossible to erect a 
boundary defining the extremities of Soviet foreign policy ambitions. 
According to Gray 'The Soviet Union has to seek to expand her area of 
control precisely because nothing she holds is, or can be, secure 
enou ah' ·15 and b , 
c. there is no Soviet conception of a stable international political order. 
As a true revolutionary power, the Soviet Union views international 
politics as an arena for relentless competition with opposing centres of 
power. 
Gray's thesis on the Soviet Union is neatly captured in his 1984 proclamation that: 
The Soviet Union is both a rising power seeking its place in the sun 
with no identifiable limits to its amhitions, and it is an insecure empire 
possibly tempted to strengthen its extant grip on marcher territories by 
extending the frontiers of its hegemonic imperium. These feature and 
considerations are overlaid with a stale ideology that has universalistic, 
messianic pretensions. 16 
Secondly, the 1980s would be a dangerous decade for the West not because 
one could discern an emerging 'window of opportunity' to be exploited by ruthless 
Soviet leaders in possession of superior military power, but because structural 
weaknesses in the Soviet empire might provide an incentive for external adventure 
embroiling the West in a military confrontation. 
14 Colin S. Gray, 'Arms Control in Soviet Policy', Air Force Magazine, 63(3), 
March 1980, p.66. 
15 Colin S. Gray, 'The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, 
and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1980s', Orbis, 25(1) , Spring 1981, 
p.15. This argument is also conveyed in Colin S. Gray, 'Understanding Soviet 
Military Power', Problems of Communism, XXX(2), Marchi April 1981, 
pp.64-67. 
16 Colin S. Gray, 'War-Fighting For Deterrence', op.cit. , p.7. 
l 
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... a malign combination of relative military strength and perceived 
domestic weakness could make the Soviet Union a particularly 
dangerous player in the international politics of the 1980s.17 
S6 
Perceived weaknesses could originate from within the Soviet domestic economy or 
the highly centralised political system, or from a drive by the Soviet Republics for 
political succession resulting in an imperial crisis. 
Gray attempts to unify the assumptions - Realpolitik, a permanent Soviet-
American political rivalry and the Soviet Union as an insecure empire - with an 
analysis of international politics based on the principles of Classical Geopolitics.l 8 
He claims that East-West relations can only be properly understood if explained in 
geopolitical terms, with geopolitics referring to 'the relation of international political 
power to the geographical setting'.19 Gray is a disciple of the Mackinder-Spykman 
view that the world 
... reduced to its power related essentials, consists of a Heartland 
superpower that is locked in a permanent struggle with the offshore, 
insular continental superpower, the United States, for effective control 
of the Rimlands and marginal sea of the World-Island ... The Soviet 
objective is power - and then more power.20 
While Classical Geopolitics has received little attention in the fields of international 
relations and strategic studies since 1945,21 geopolitical analysis permeates all of 
Gray's writings to the present day.22 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, and Crisis 
Management', op.cit., p.68. See also 'The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic 
Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1980s', 
op.cit., pp.13-28. 
'Classical Geopolitics' refers to Sir Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals 
and Reality, Norton, New York, 1962 (first published in 1919), and Nicholas 
Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1944. 
Gray borrowed this definition fronl Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in 
a Divided World, Methuen, London, 1964. 
Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics o/the Nuclear Era, op.cit., pp.64-65. 
For a unique collection of essays see Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe 
(eds), On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
1985. 
Gray has remained dogged explaining East-West relations in a Mackinder-
Spykman geopolitical mould. See his The Geopolitics of Superpower, op.cit., 
especially chapter 2. For an interesting discussion of Gray's contribution to 
geopolitical analysis in the nuclear era see Francis P. Sempa, 'Geopolitics and 
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Nuclear Deterrence: A Misleading Focus 
The aim of the following discussion is to demonstrate how the three 
assumptions comprising Colin Gray's 'world view', fonn the intellectual foundation 
of his theory of victory in nuclear war. To focus exclusively on the trail of strategic 
logic developed by Gray to justify the theory of victory, or the technological and 
operational requirements of his nuclear war-winning strategy, is to ignore the fact that 
debates over contending theories of nuclear deterrence are in essence political debates 
over issues such as the character of the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet-
American conflict. As Robert Tucker stated: 
Among the priesthood of experts, the nuclear debate is not primarily a 
debate over nuclear weapons but a debate over politics.23 
Through a combination of design and good fortune, the assumptions of the 
theory of victory have been sheltered from debate in strategic studies literature. 
Rarely is Gray explicit in making a connection between his strategic arguments on 
war-fighting deterrence, the MX ICBM and strategic defence for example, and the 
assumptions of his strategic thinking.24 Because the assumptions are mainly 
conveyed in writings other than the two 'theory of victory' articles, those who are 
selective in their reading of Gray will acquire a distorted image of his 'world view'. 
More importantly, when Gray advocated and defended the theory of victory in the 
early 1980s, he deliberately formed (to borrow from Edward Thompson) an enclosed 
circle of self-validating strategic arguments which excluded a detailed representation 
of the assumptions.25 Consequently much of the strategic discourse on nuclear 
American Strategy: A Reassessment', Strategic Review, XV(2), Spring 1987, 
especially pp.33-34. 
23 Robert Tucker, 'The Nuclear Debate', Foreign Affairs, 63(1), 1984-85, pA. 
24 A rare example is Gray's Nuclear Strategy and National Style, 1986. 
25 Edward Thompson, 'Deterrence and Addiction', in Frank Barnaby and 
Geoffrey Thomas (eds), The Nuclear Arms Race - Control or Catastrophe?, 
Francis Pinter, London 1982, p.59. 
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deterrence reached a stalemate because Gray had recourse to self-validating strategic 
arguments with which to uphold his thesis and denigrate all dissenting commentary. 
This series of self-justifying arguments in Gray 's writings can be clearly 
presented. Gray begins by stating that nuclear deterrence is a 'regrettable 
necessity'.26 The United States has no choice but to rely on nuclear deterrence as the 
ultimate guarantor of national survival.27 While there is no concrete evidence to 
prove that nuclear deterrence is the sole reason why the United States and the Soviet 
Union have not engaged directly in a military conflict since 1945, Gray argues that 
'the nuclear deterrence system is ineradicable: it is the only system that we have, it 
works, and it has to be nurtured so that it continues to work' .28 More importantly, 
accepting the need for nuclear deterrence must logically involve preparations for 
nuclear war; the U.S. must devise an operational strategic nuclear doctrine from 
which it can' accomplish its policy purposes, whatever they may be at the time' .29 
The need for an operational nuclear strategy relating means to ends is then 
used by Gray as the foundation for advocating his theory of victory which defines a 
clear policy objective for the U.S. - the forcible demise of the Soviet Union and the 
physical protection of the American homeland. The theory of victory is presented as 
a theory of nuclear deterrence surpassing stable deterrence through Mutual Assured 
Destruction. The logic has now turned full circle. In summary, Gray argues that 
because there is no alternative to nuclear deterrence the only relevant policy debate 
involves contending nuclear strategies of which the theory of victory is allegedly 
superior to all other war-fighting strategies. 
26 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: A Regrettable Necessity', SAIS Review, 
3(1), Winter-Spring 1983, pp.13-28. 
27 For a dissenting view see John Mueller, 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear 
Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, International Security, 13(2), Fall 
1988, pp.55-79. 
28 Colin S. Gray, '''Dangerous to Your Health"': The Debate Over Nuclear 
Strategy and War', Orbis, 26(2), Spring 1982, pp.340. 
29 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: A Regrettable Necessity', op.cit., p.26. 
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To comprehend this closed circle of argumentation it is important to ask some 
fundamental questions: Why, according to Gray, is there no alternative to a 'sys tem' 
of nuclear deterrence? Why must the United States rely on credible nuclear threats as 
the basis for its national security and survival? What is the rationale for Gray's claim 
that 'the nuclear deterrent cannot be eschewed' and that 'nuclear strategy must have a 
future; there is no other sensible choice '?30 The answer to these questions can be 
located in Gray's insistent belief in a pennanent East-West political conflict resulting 
from the fixed structure of international relations and the existence of an adversary 
(the Soviet Union) waging an inalienable struggle against Western democracies. 
Gray is unable to visualise an alternative international system free from the dangers of 
global nuclear war, or to conceive of a stable world order in which the United States 
and the Soviet Union accommodate and resolve their political differences. Rather, 
Gray alleges that the anarchic international system dominated by Power Politics 
requires preparations for nuclear war. 
Nuclear strategy flows from the needs of the structure of international 
politics. -
Once strategy is reecognised to be a necessity, the only Issue 
remaining is how to pursue it most effectively) 1 
For Gray, the logic is clear and straightforward. 
Focusing here on the assumptions of Gray's strategic logic provides a further 
insight into the arguments used to support the theory of victory in nuclear war. For 
example, because international politics is portrayed as a permanent division between a 
revolutionary and expansionist power (the Soviet Union) and a status quo or 
'satisfied' power32 (the United States), Gray argues that 
30 Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, 'Nuclear Strategy: Is There a Future?', 
Washington Quarterly, 6(3), Summer 1983, p.66. 
31 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, op.cit., p.26. 
32 Colin S. Gray, 'Anns Control and European Security: Some Basic Issues', in 
L. Hagen (ed.), The Crisis in Western Security, Croom Helm, London, 1982, 
p.llO. 
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Post-colonial, post-great-power NATO-Europe, in alliance with a 
geopolitically satisfied, island-superpower United States, can be 
trusted with whatever degree of military superiority it can secure and 
sustain - the Soviet empire cannot be so trusted.33 
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Furthermore, strategic superiority for the United States is vital following the logic of 
Classical Geopolitics. If credible first-use nuclear threats are to be issued on behalf of 
distant allies then American strategic superiority for escalation dominance is 
paramount. 
Gray's claim for U.S. strategic superiority also raises the important issue of 
the relationship between the theory of victory and nuclear war causation. Lawrence 
Freedman noted that 'The question of what happens if deterrence fails is vital to the 
intellectual cohesion and credibility of nuclear strategy')4 But Gray's answer to the 
question: 'what are likely to be the causes of deterrence failure', is vital for the 
credibility of his theory of victory. As explained in Chapter Two, critics of Gray's 
theory of victory maintain that nuclear war-winning strategies are destabilising and 
increase the risk of nuclear war. Gray, however, is adamant that the United States, in 
possession of superior offensive and defensive military capabilities, cannot possibly 
be either an underlying or precipitate cause of World War III. On the contrary, the 
U.S. would be in most need of a nuclear war-winning strategy 'on the one night in 
twenty or thirty years' when 
Soviet leaders were unable to discern any politically acceptable 
alternative to taking military action or because they had become 
convinced that war was inevitable)5 
In other words, because the Soviet Union is allegedly an insecure empire, the U.S. 
must be prepared to respond to an impending military confrontation originating from 
circumstances where 'truly desperate Soviet leaders' confronted 'what they might 
33 Colin S. Gray, 'War-Fighting For Deterrence', op.cit., p.7. 
34 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, op.cit., p.395. 
35 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, op.cit., p.113. 
f 
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define as a crisis of empire and regime')6 For Gray, the most plausible context for an 
outbreak of nuclear war is one where the United States is compelled to respond to 
Soviet aggression (most likely on attempted seizure of territory in Western Europe or 
the Persian Gulf region) stemming from a political crisis within the Soviet empire)7 
Gray's view of the Soviet Union as an insecure empire has, therefore, largely 
detennined the course of his strategic thinking. 
To recapitulate, the driving force behind Gray's theory of victory in nuclear 
war is the framework of assumptions reviewed earlier that compelled him to use a 
chain of strategic logic to develop his thesis. The theory of victory, therefore, 
emerged from an unchanging world view seen through the eyes of one American 
civilian strategic analyst wearing the 'strait-jacket' of a contentious theory of 
international relations - Classical Realism or Realpolitik. There is a very close 
relationship between Gray's VISIon of international relations; Soviet-American 
political rivalry; Soviet strategic culture and geopolitics, and his argument for a 
theory of victory. If the three assumptions are the rationale for the strategic logic 
behind Gray's theory of victory, as this discussion claims, then that strategic logic can 
be sustained only if the assumptions are shown to be valid under critical examination. 
Assessing the Assumptions: Towards a Critique 
As a preliminary observation, a feature of the three related assumptions is 
Gray's pretence that they are not controversial. He states categorically that they 
portray the world 'as it really is'; that they constitute truths concerning the essence of 
36 Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Deterrence and Technological Change: Retrospect 
and Prospect', in Roman Kolkowicz (ed.), The Logic of Nuclear Terror, 
op.cit., p.162. 
37 This has remained a consistent theme in Gray's writings. See 'The Military 
Requirements of U.S. Strategy', Military Review, LIX(9) , September 1979, 
p.7; 'Arms Control: Problems' in RJames Woolsey (ed.), Nuclear Arms: 
Ethics, Strategy, Politics, ICS Press, San Francisco, 1984, p.161 ; and 
'Strategic Forces' in Joseph Kruzel, American Defense Annual, 1981-1987, 
op.cit., p.68. 
, .
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international relations and the nature of Soviet-American political competition. Gray 
claims to be upholding the one correct view of international relations. The following 
is a fair sample of pertinent comments: 
... policy makers are obliged by the ethic of consequences to deal with 
the world as it is, not as they would like it to be.38 
u.S. policy must be designed to cope with the world as it is)9 
Deplorable though it may be, the fact remains that the world of 
international politics is a jungle wherein the strong and the ruthless 
devour the weak.4o 
Realpolitik, for all the ambivalence of the central concepts of power 
and interest, is the enduring condition of international politics.41 
... The academic study of international relations has 'taken off' into a 
self sustained growth in a direction very largely irrelevant to what one 
must call the real world.42 
When Gray stated in an article that Soviet society is locked into a 'life-and-death' 
struggle with American society he added in a footnote, 'This is a statement of fact and 
has no political coloration whatever' .43 According to Philip Lawrence, 'The 
Hobbesian impulse to conflict' is portrayed by Gray 'as a basic datum, the immutable 
fact upon which strategic studies rests'.44 
Gray's style of providing statements of fact concerning the 'real world' has a 
number of implications. It enables Gray to revel in his own circular and self-
confirming strategic logic on the theory of victory. Gray relies on a technique where 
the assumptions are briefly presented as truths or facts, and remain as background 
38 Colin S. Gray, 'Dangerous to Your Health: The Debate Over Nuclear 
Strategy and War', op.cit., p.335. 
39 Colin S. Gray, 'International Order and American Power', op.cit., p.29. 
40 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, op.cit., p.28. 
41 Colin S. Gray, 'Foreign Policy - There is No Choice', op.cit., p.125. 
42 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, op.cit., p.3. 
43 Colin S. Gray, 'Who's Afraid of the Cruise Missile?', op.cit., p.10, footnote 
15. 
44 Philip K. Lawrence, 'Nuclear Strategy and Political Theory: A Critical 
Assessment', Review of International Studies, 11(2), April 1985, p.115. 
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while a detailed thesis on war-fighting deterrence and victory is developed. It also 
enables Gray to reject outright all other contributions to the debate on nuclear 
deterrence for their alleged failure to address the 'real world' of Power Politics and 
Soviet-American political and ideological competition. If the five selected statements 
cited above are accepted at face value there would be no need for debate and Gray's 
thesis on war-fighting deterrence and victory would not be that controversial. But 
how do we know the true nature of international relations? Gray's only claim is that 
his 'world view' portrays reality whereas rival interpretations of international 
relations do not. Gray provides no evidence to support his convictions. The 
weakness of this intellectual device is glaring. 
Gray maintains that there is an 'objective world' from which the enduring 
features of international politics can be distilled and described. These features, 
including geopolitics, Power Politics, and the nature of the Soviet adversary, should 
determine American national security objectives and help define its foreign policy 
interests. The U.S. must, therefore, operate within the structural boundaries of 
international politics. Implicit in Gray's argument is that America's participation in 
global politics will not impact on the very nature of the international system but rather 
is necessary because of the way the international system operates. But the course of 
American action prescribed by Gray - the global containment of Soviet power and the 
possession of a nuclear war-winning strategy for deterrence - can only perpetuate the 
very international system which led Gray to justify this course of action in the first 
instance. Gray concludes that because international relations is essentially a game of 
Power Politics, the U.S. must be relentless in its defence of vital global interests and 
denial of Soviet military power and political influence. Gray's advice to U.S. 
policymakers, however, will only help to ensure that the Soviet Union and the United 
States are locked into a permanent adversary relationship with the attendant risk of 
nuclear war. 
6-+ 
Furthennore, much of Gray's contribution to strategic debates is itself 
theoretical, especially the thesis on war-fighting deterrence and victory. Gray 
acknowledges that because of the absence of historical experience relating to nuclear 
war, the merit of one argument on nuclear deterrence can only be judged in relation to 
another argument or set of ideas. Yet Gray attempts to foreclose theoretical debate by 
either dismissing contending approaches to the study of international relations for 
their unreality and irrelevance, or subsuming all foreign policy issues under the rubric 
of Power Politics. Gray's insistence on attempting to describe the world 'as it is' 
leads to a debasement of the very notion of international relations theory. Finally, in 
1982, Gray stated: 
All strategists acquire what may be termed a strategic ideology. 
Whatever the issue may be, no strategist simply appraises the facts. 45 
For nearly two decades Gray has been presenting to readers so-called facts about the 
nature of international relations and the geopolitical basis for East-West political 
competition, to support his main strategic arguments on nuclear deterrence. He has 
claimed, for example, that American national security policy must be guided by the 
structural nature of the international system. 
Two important theoretical developments, which set the agenda for debate in 
the American strategic studies community during the 1980s, provide a useful avenue 
to further challenge the assumptions of Gray's theory of victory. In his 1977 article, 
'Across the Nuclear Divide', Gray concluded triumphantly that 'the burden of proof 
would seem to rest upon those who claim, explicitly or tacitly, that 1945 truly 
45 Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy, op.cit., p.3. For an early 
presentation of this view see Gray's 'Hawks and Doves: Values and 
Diplomacy', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 3(1), Spring 1975, 
where on p.93 he states: 'The sequential and incremental nature of strategic 
debate ensures that the professional strategist tends not to take a sabbatical to 
ask fundamental questions of himself. The larger assumptions tend to remain 
unexamined and inarticulated. What is the nature of international politics? 
What is the role of force in international politics? What are the proper 
functions of strategic forces?'. 
f . 
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marked a great divide in international political affairs'. 46 Gray argued that the 
practice of statecraft and the nature of international relations had not been ruptured by 
the advent of nuclear weapons. 
In recent years, Robert Jervis has convincingly demonstrated - through a 
carefully articulated thesis built on the conceptual foundations laid by Bernard Brodie 
and Thomas Schelling - that nuclear weapons have both revolutionised military 
strategy and transformed the nature of international relations, especially the way 
nuclear anned states organise and conduct their external relations.47 In particular, 
Jervis put forward two related arguments which have serious implications for the 
validity of Gray's view of strategy and statecraft in the nuclear age. Firstly, military 
victory in nuclear war is impossible. An adversary in possession of an invulnerable 
nuclear retaliatory capability would always be capable of raising a nuclear conflict to 
. 
higher levels of destruction, irrespective of which side possessed more counterforce 
capabilities. The condition of 'Mutual Vulnerability' has, therefore, rendered military 
strategy, as applied to conventional wars prior to 1945, obsolete in the nuclear age.48 
Secondly, Jervis argued that advocates of nuclear war-fighting strategies apply 
pre-1945 military concepts and principles to the nuclear age. This is a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as 'conventionalization'. Beginning with Hans Morgenthau49 
46 Colin S. Gray, 'Across the Nuclear Divide - Strategic Studies, Past and 
Present;, op.cit., p.46. 
47 For the development of Jervis' thesis on the 'Nuclear Revolution' see 'Why 
Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter', Political Science Quarterly, 94(4), 
Winter 1979-80,pp.617-633; The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1984; 'The Nuclear Revolution and the 
Common Defense', Political Science Quarterly, 10(5), 1986, pp.689-703; and 
The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of 
Armageddon, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989. 
48 This argument is conveyed most strongly in 'The Nuclear Revolution and the 
Common Defense', op.cit. 
49 Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy', The American 
Political Science Review, 58(1), March 1964, pp.23-35; 'The Fallacy of 
Thinking Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons' in David Carlton and 
Carlo Schaerf (eds), Arms Control and Technological Innovation, Croom 
Helm, London, 1977, pp.255-264. An excellent discussion of 
'conventionalization' with extensive references to Colin Gray, is Charles-
Philippe David, Debating Counterforce: A Conventional Approach in the 
Nuclear Age, Westview Press, Boulder, Col., 1987. 
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and popularised during the 1980s, 'conventionalization' amounts to the claim that 
because victory is no longer a viable objective for nuclear armed adversaries unable 
to physically protect their homeland, efforts to acquire more war-fighting capabilities 
and devise a more sophisticated nuclear war-fighting strategy are non-sensical or 
illogical. 
The second important development during the 1980s was the emergence of 
empirical and theoretical analyses that questioned the main assumption of deterrence 
theory: that political leaders will always behave rationally and make rational 
decisions, even during a crisis when deterrence would be tested.50 The 'rational actor' 
assumption has been challenged on the basis that it excludes a number of factors 
which may effect decision making, especially decisions on whether or not to go to 
war. These factors include psychological pressures that might lead to irrational 
• , 
behaviour, misperception, and the inability of leaders to make rational decisions given 
the pressures of time and the over-supply of infonnation.51 In developing a war-
fighting theory of nuclear deterrence, Gray asspmes that Soviet leaders. will behave 
the way he has specified and totally ignores the possibility of one or more of those 
factors cited above resulting in a Soviet decision to, either initiate nuclear war through 
a pre-emptive strike or, pursue a course of action that increases the risk of inadvertent 
nuclear war. While threats to destroy the Soviet leadership would probably 'enhance 
Soviet anxieties', as Gray claims, how these heightened anxieties would induce Soviet 
restraint in a crisis is not at all clear. 
This criticism of Gray's assumption of rational Soviet decision-making and 
behaviour, during an acute crisis involving the United States, can be broadened to 
include his prognosis of the Soviet threat to Western security for the 1980s and 1990s. 
50 See R. Jervis, R.N. Lebow and J.G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985; and Paul C. Stem, R. Axelrod, R. 
Jervis and R. Radner (eds) Perspectives on Deterrence, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1989. 
51 A useful overview of the critique of 'rational deterrence theory' can be found 
in Andrew Mack, What is Wrong With Deterrence Theory, Working Paper 
No.76, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, October 1989. 
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When Gray developed a critique of stable deterrence through Mutual Assured 
Destruction he was very critical of American civilian strategists for not addressing the 
Soviet Union as a strategic/cultural entity striving to gain military and political 
advantage over the United States. His main underlying concern was that a condition 
of rough parity at the strategic nuclear level combined with a clearly identifiable 
malign Soviet style in strategy would undermine America's national security in the 
1980s. In particular it was argued that the U.S. would no longer be able to credibly 
issue nuclear threats on behalf of allies in Europe and the Middle East, whereas the 
Soviet Union would be prepared to use its newly acquired strategic power to secure a 
favourable war outcome if nuclear deterrence failed. The anticipated consequences of 
Gray's strategic assessment, however, did not eventuate in the 1980s. The failure of 
Gray's 'Soviet threat' to materialize questions the validity of his interpretation of 
Soviet strategic culture. 
Gray's prescription of the 1980s as a 'dangerous decade' for the West, most 
likely stemming from a Soviet imperial crisis, sits uncomfortably alongside the 
. 
pattern of Soviet behaviour in international politics during this period. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Gray exaggerated the political significance of the 
Soviet military build up during the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Union did not use 
the military power acquired during the 1970s as a platfonn to attain either strategic 
superiority over the United States or political leverage. There has also been a 
contraction of Soviet foreign military intervention symbolised by the military 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. More recently the disintegration of Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe has not resulted in a Soviet military response to restore 
political authority as was experienced in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). 
And the move by an increasing number of Soviet Republics to gain political 
independence has been met with a fair degree of caution and restraint from the Soviet 
Union. In addition, the currently benign character of Soviet-American political 
relations further reduces the prospects of a direct military confrontation between the 
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superpowers, and lends support to the popular view that an opportunity presently 
exists for a resolution of those outstanding political differences dividing East and 
West. 
There are fundamental weaknesses in Gray's gloomy assessment of Soviet 
long term intentions towards the United States. He engages in the fairly simple 
academic exercise of using selective source materials to develop his thesis. Gray 
relies heavily on the works of analysts of Soviet history and strategy, such as Richard 
Pipes and Edward Luttwak, to present his thesis on Soviet strategic nuclear doctrine. 
He also quotes selectively from professional Soviet military journals. The important 
point is that there does exist an equally impressive body of literature to strongly 
contest Gray's view of Soviet style in strategy.52 The second weakness is that apart 
from offering an interpretation of Soviet history and culture, Gray consistently fails to 
provide any evidence to support his extreme views. Gray's claim that the Soviet 
Union is waging an 'inalienable political struggle' against the West and that it is an 
insecure empire, to use only two examples, remain unsubstantiated. According to 
Charles Reynolds, most of Gray's arguments concerning the Soviet Union are based 
on nothing more than value judgements which raise many important normative 
Issues.53 
Finally, the one noticeable feature of all Gray's writings after 1985 is the 
persistent use of arguments which have clearly been overtaken by events in 
international relations. The resilience of Gray's 'world view' to changing 
circumstances has resulted in his Soviet threat thesis becoming obsolete. The 
arguments used by Gray in 1990 to portray the Soviet Union as a pennanent 
52 A useful starting point is Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence and 
Strategic Arms Limitations in Soviet Policy', International Security, 3, 
Summer 1978, pp.112-147. A recent, and penetrating, critique of the Soviet 
nuclear threat thesis developed by American analysts during the 1970s and 
1980s is provided by Richard Ned Lebow in 'Malign Analysts or Evil 
Empire?: Western Images of Soviet Nuclear Strategy', International Journal, 
XLIV(l), Winter 1988-89, pp. 1-40. 
53 Charles Reynolds, The Politics o/War: A Study 0/ the Rationality o/Violence 
in Inter-State Relations, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordhsire, 1989, pp.96-97. 
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American adversary are indistinguishable from those he put forward a decade earlier. 
Even the tone of Gray's writings today and the language employed are identical to 
those of the 1970s. This can be demonstrated by answering the following questions. 
What has been Gray's assessment of the Soviet Union since Gorbachev's ascendancy 
to power in 1985? How does Gray characterise the marked improvement in Soviet-
American political relations in the second half of the 1980s? How does he interpret 
events in Europe as recent as December 1989? 
According to Gray, the reform process undertaken by Gorbachev, commonly 
known as Perestroika, must not blind Western leaders to 'the still persisting facts of 
Russian-Soviet culture' that should remind us of the need 'to keep our missile 
guidance systems well calibrated' .54 Furthermore, Gray describes the improvement in 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after 1986 as only a 
I 
transitory phase in what remains a permanent struggle between two antagonistic 
social and political systems.55 
Gray still argues that America's principal external security condi~ion, the 
Soviet Union, has not abandoned its global hegemonic ambitions, and that it 
continues to engage in a relentless pursuit for more power and influence at the 
expense of American interests.56 He claims that the Soviet Union deliberately uses 
the arms control process to secure political and strategic advantage over the United 
States. Despite the new momentum of dialogue between the major powers 
established through the arms control process, Gray has been very critical of all arms 
control negotiations that have taken pIece in the 1980s.57 The political transformation 
54 Colin S. Gray, 'National Signatures in Defense', op.cit., p.25. 
55 Colin S. Gray, 'The United States and the Balance of Power: Another "Weary 
Titan? ''', Defense Science, 7(7), July 1988, pp.56-59. 
56 Colin S. Gray, 'Perestroika and the Realities of Soviet Power ', National 
Defense, LXXV(447), April 1988, pp.41-43. 
57 See Colin S. Gray, 'Outlook Is as Bleak on Regional Conflict as on Arms', 
Los Angeles Times, 10 November 1985, Part IV, p.5; 'The Gorbachev 
Offensive', Society, 24(5), July/August 1989, pp.38-44; 'In Pursuit of START, 
We're Committing Familiar Sins', Los Angeles Times, 15 December 1987, 
Part II, p.7; 'Arms Control Without Strategy ... Again: Blundering On', 
! 
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of Eastern Europe in early 1990 has also been received cautiously by Gray, from the 
perspective of American national security. He believes the United States must remain 
heavily anned and vigilant because: 
much of the geostrategic and other prudential logic that should help 
shape U.S. policy and the U.S. defense effort in this decade [1990s] 
applies, regardless of the context of the political headlines of the day.58 
In other words, the United States must retain a robust nuclear deterrent because 'the 
future of international security politics is likely to be very much like its past' .59 
Defense Science, 7(3), March 1988, pp.53-55; 'People, Not Weapons, Make 
War', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45(4), May 1989, p.34. 
58 Colin S. Gray, 'Tomorrow's Forecast: Wanner/Still Cloudy', U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 116, May 1990, p.40. 
59 Ibid., p.43. 
CONCLUSION 
During the 1980s, Colin Gray's primary objective in advocating the theory of 
victory in nuclear war was to explain why the United States ought to acquire a 
strategic nuclear doctrine which in the event of deterrence failure 'should hold U.S. 
casualties down to a level compatible with national survival and recovery'. 1 In 
essence, the theory of victory in nuclear war is a theory of nuclear deterrence or war 
prevention. Gray argued that the provision of a significant damage limitation 
capability for the American homeland through active and passive defences would 
overcome the paralysing condition of U.S. self-deterrence, thus restoring credibility to 
extended deterrence. Furthermore, the acquisition of a survivably based hard target 
counterforce ICBM, such as MX, capable of destroying in a prompt retaliatory strike 
the most highly valued assets of the Soviet state, should have the maximum 
dissuasive effect on the minds of Soviet leaders contemplating the use of military 
force to respond to an acute security crisis. 
The theory of victory emerged from a decade where the prevailing American 
concept of strategic stability or stable deterrence through Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD) had come under attack from within the civilian strategic studies community 
and official circles. It was argued that the strategic, political and technological 
environment of the 1970s undermined the assumptions of stable deterrence thinking. 
Consequently, the U.S. was in urgent need of a flexible and credible nuclear war-
fighting strategy that avoided suicidal threats to lay waste to the Soviet homeland. 
Gray became a leading critic of MAD during the 1970s and spent most of the decade 
trying to unify concepts such as 'Counterforce', 'Damage Limitation' and 'City 
Avoidance' into a cohesive operational strategic nuclear doctrine informed by a 
superior theory of nuclear deterrence. The most noteworthy development in the 
formulation of Gray's strategic theory was how he went beyond the requirements of a 
Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, 'Victory is Possible', op.cit., p.2S. 
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nuclear war-fighting strategy, such as limited and controlled nuclear war for intra-war 
deterrence or Soviet 'victory denial', to espouse a war-winning or classical strategy. 
When Gray fIrst articulated the theory of victory in 1979 he claimed to be offering an 
impeccable theory of nuclear deterrence based on strategic logic which would compel 
the United States to invest in those offensive and defensive technologies for his 
nuclear war-winning strategy to become viable. 
This thesis has strongly challenged the political, technological and operational 
feasibility of Gray's theory of victory in nuclear war. The criticisms reviewed in 
Chapter Two raise innumerable questions relating to the implementation of Gray's 
war-winning strategy and how its central objective, a political victory for the United 
States, would be secured. Defending population centres from a long range nuclear 
missile attack remains an unobtainable strategic objective for the indefInite future, 
notwithstanding President Reagan's 1983 pledge to 'render nuclear weapons 
impotent and obsolete' via a multi-tiered space based ballistic missile defence. The 
offensive nuclear targeting doctrine favoured by Gray is equally problematic. It is 
increasingly difficult for the United States to locate, isolate, and successfully target 
Soviet command authorities and leadership centres, because the Soviet Union 
continues to invest heavily in those measures to ensure its own physical survival for 
the duration of a nuclear exchange. In addition, a deliberate strategy of counter-
leadership targeting is incompatible with nuclear war termination. Destroying the 
Soviet leadership, either in the initial or latter stages of a nuclear exchange, removes 
the principal avenue through which a negotiated settlement short of total nuclear war 
could be achieved. Counter-leadership targeting would most likely result in a process 
of rapid escalation to an all out nuclear war. The theory of victory would, therefore, 
be indistinguishable from Mutual Assured Destruction. 
Those critics who confined their analysis of the theory of victory to technical 
issues alone, failed to address the broader question of whether the theory has a sound 
theoretical basis, as Gray alleged. They focused on the important question: is Gray's 
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theory of victory technologically and operationally feasible? - but bypassed an 
equally important question: is it desirable? The issue of desirability or otherwise is 
irrelevant if our answer to the above question of feasibility is in the affmnative. 
Whether or not the theory of victory is feasible is an issue that cannot be settled 
conclusively. It remains possible for the United States to undertake massive and 
sustained investment in ballistic missile defence systems and modernise the strategic 
triad to achieve a measure of damage limitation for the American homeland, perhaps 
nearing Gray's figure of 20 million U.S. casualties. While such an effort would not 
guarantee a political victory in nuclear war, it highlights the opportunities that exist 
for the United States to follow Gray's strategic advocacy. 
Some critics did argue that nuclear war-winning strategies are not desirable 
because they are destabilising and increase the risk of nuclear war. This criticism, 
however, did not amount to a detailed analysis of either Gray's argument that a theory 
of victory is the best possible war-fighting/deterrent strategy or its underlying 
assumptions. The critics simply presented their own concept~on of what deters the 
Soviet Union and the requirements of stable deterrence, without addressing Gray on 
his own terms. Adherents to the view that nuclear war-winning strategies are 
destabilising only succeeded in provoking a harsh rebuke from Gray, enabling him to 
forcefully reiterate his theory of victory throughout the 1980s. 
Although the theory of victory was a product of strategic developments in the 
1970s, it remains today an expression of what Gray believes is technologically 
feasible, strategically essential for deterrence and war-fighting but not politically 
viable for at least the remainder of this Century. Assuming that under optimum 
political and technological conditions, the United States attempted to acquire 
sufficient offensive nuclear firepower and defensive capabilities to plan for both the 
physical protection of its population centres and a political victory following a nuclear 
exchange, the important question of whether a plausible strategic theory would justify 
"" 1 , .... 
a transition towards a nuclear war-winning strategy would not have been satisfactorily 
addressed in strategic studies literature. 
This thesis has demonstrated that a comprehensive and balanced critique of 
Gray's theory of victory in nuclear war must focus on the assumptions underpinning 
his strategic reasoning. In particular, it was highlighted that the chain of strategic 
logic used by Gray to criticise stable deterrence through Mutual Assured Destruction 
and uphold his nuclear war-winning strategy, is based on a fixed 'world view' 
consisting of three arguments: 
• power politics and the balance of power are the defining characteristics 
of international relations in the nuclear age; 
• the Soviet Union is an insecure empire ideologically committed to an 
unremitting political struggle with an antagonistic social system, 
whereas the United States is a contented status quo power with no 
hegemonic ambitions; and 
• for geopolitical reasons the United States and the Soviet Union are 
locked into a political competition for global power and influence. 
For nearly two decades, Gray has been relentless in presenting these three 
assumptions as truths or facts concerning international relations and the dynamics of 
great power rivalry. An assessment of these assumptions in Chapter Three, however, 
revealed that they can be persuasively contested when subjected to empirical and 
theoretical analysis. 
Gray's persistent use of questionable assumptions - developed more than a 
decade ago under different political and strategic circumstances to both explain the 
nature of Soviet-American political relations in 1990 and advise national security 
policies for the United States - leads to three concluding comments. Firstly, the 
assumptions of the theory of victory discussed in Chapter Three are increasingly 
irrelevant to the maintenance of global stability in the 1990s, especially in preserving 
stable deterrence and reducing the risk of nuclear war. Realpolitik, an insecure 
75 
empIre wagIng a life and death struggle against Western democracies , and a 
permanent Soviet-American competition, are fanciful conceptions that have little, if 
anything, to do with the way the Soviet Union and the United States conduct and 
manage their relationship today. Secondly, because Gray is convinced that his 
strategic reasoning has enduring relevance for America's role in containing the Soviet 
Union, he can only continue to advocate a theory of war-fighting deterrence for 
nuclear victory by portraying international relations, the Soviet adversary, and Soviet-
American political rivalry the way he did in the mid-1970s. If Gray relaxed the three 
rigid assumptions of his theory of victory he would at once unravel the strategic logic 
underpinning that theory and undermine the entire rationale of his strategic advocacy. 
This thesis has demonstrated how the strategic arguments used by Gray to advocate 
the theory of victory in nuclear war conceal an edifice of highly questionable 
assumptions. It can be concluded that, at least for the 1990s, the theory of victory is 
irrelevant to American strategic nuclear doctrine. 
I' 
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